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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The law pertaining to the dismissal of a worker from his
employment has been the object of intense scrutiny, both on a
national and international level, in recent years. While a
number of countries have made significant strides in the area
of job protection, standards worldwide are by no means
uniform. It has been estimated that in the United States
alone, there are at least fifty million private sector
employees who are, for the most part, unprotected against
unjust discharge.1 It is projected by some that, of these,
between fifty thousand and two hundred thousand are unfairly
terminated each year.2 Others would put the figure "at least
in the neighborhood of 200,000."3 It need hardly be said
that the phenomenon is not unique to the United States.
This paper will begin with an investigation of the
activity of the supra-national International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) in this area of the law. Using this as a
yardstick, a comparative analysis of the unfair dismissal
laws of the United States and some foreign countries (mainly
Western European) will be undertaken. Finally, the issue
will be addressed in the South African context. An
assessment will be made of the relative quality of the
protection afforded workers in South Africa and, using
1
2
conclusions reached from the comparative study, the validity
of calls for a general unfair dismissal statute in the
country will be considered.
3NOTES
CHAPTER I
1. Stieber, Introduction, Conference on Protecting
Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Discharge, 1 (1983).
2. Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized
Employees Against Unfair Discharge, 32 Proc. Ann. Meeting In-
dus. ReI. Res. Ass'n., 160-161 (1980).
3. Remarks of Prof. Clyde Summers, Employment At Will
in the 1980's: A Look Ahead - The Experts Predict, 224 Daily
Lab. Rep. 25 (Nov. 19, 1982).
CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL LAW
liThe law of unfair dismissal originated in the defects of
the common law of wrongful dismissal."1 In common law legal
systems, as in most others, the employment relationship is,
in the absence of statutory regulation, governed strictly by
the law of contract. Employer and employee are viewed as
contractors on an equal footing, both fully entitled (except
in the case of definite duration contracts) to terminate
their relationship at any time with virtual impunity.2 No
reasons are required of the terminating employer, let alone
any form of justification. Nor are any rights accorded the
terminated employee as far as ability to challenge the
employer's motive or motivation for discharge is concerned.
No cognizance need be taken of the effect the wage earner's
termination would have on his dependents, because of the
irrelevance thereof to the strict contractual nature of the
relationship. The concept of unfair dismissal law was the
obvious consequence of this harsh and often inequitable set-
up. The idea was to provide employees with protection over
and above that resulting from the contract of employment per
se, a protection against termination which was arbitrary and
without just cause.
4
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CHAPTER II
1. Cassim, Unfair Dismissal,S South African I.L.J.
(1984) 275, 277.
2. In the United States, common law requires no
notice period whatsoever. In countries such as the United
Kingdom, Canada and South Africa, unless the dismissal is a
summary dismissal, a notice period is required. In South
Africa, a reasonable notice is required in the absence of a
relevant custom or agreement, e.g., a month's notice when the
worker is paid monthly. See Tiopazi v. Bulawayo Municipality,
1923 A.D. 317 (S.A.L.R.).
CHAPTER III
AN EXAMINATION OF ILO ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA
A. The 1950 Resolution
As alluded to earlier, very few countries had attempted
to control the often unabridged discretion accorded
managerial employees to terminate a worker. The Mexican
Constitution of 1917 contained probably the first legal
restrictions on an employer's right to dismiss a worker,l for
it provided that an employer "who dismisses a worker without
just cause •••shall be obliged, at the election of the worker,
to carry out the contract or compensate the worker in an
amount of three month's wages.,,2 Legislation in the USSR in
1922, in Mexico in 1931 and Cuba in 1934 similarly restricted
the ability to discharge a worker when based on no valid
3reason.
In 1950 the ILO, without any actual attempt to substan-
tively address the problem, tried to begin the process by
noting in the form of a resolution a lack of international
standards on the termination of employment.4 It was this
seemingly insignificant resolution that paved the way for the
far more important Recommendation 119 of 1963.
B. Recommendation 119 of 1963
Recommendation 119, Termination of Employment at the
Initiative of the Employer,S provided the major impetus for
6
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many legal systems (particularly in Europe) in their unfair
dismissal legislation. Article 2(1) provided that an
employee should not be subject to dismissal "unless there is
a valid reason connected with the capacity or conduct of the
worker, or based on the operational requirements of the
undertaking, establishment, or service." Requiring an objec-
tively valid reason for the termination of a worker was a
"landmark substantive innovation,,6 in the industrial rela-
tions law of virtually all the countries implementing
Recommendation 119.
The Recommendation also set some basic standards in regard
to a worker's ability to challenge his termination. Article
4 provided that "[a] worker who feels that his employment has
been unjustifiably terminated should be entitled ...to appeal,
within a reasonable time, against that termination •••to a
body established under a collective agreement or to a neutral
such as a court, an arbitrator, an arbitration com-
similar body." Furthermore, the Recommendation
the remedies the above mentioned bodies should
imposed the necessary limitations on these
bodies' power to interfere with the actual size of the
.workforce. 8
Other matters considered in the Recommendation include the
issues of notice periods, severance allowance and other forms
.of relevant income protection.9 During the following two
'decades, many states enacted legislation in accordance with
8the spirit of Recommendation 119 and provided protection
. t . t' f' d d' . I 10aga1ns unJus 1 1e 1sm1ssa.
C. The 1982 Instruments
In the early 1970's, the feeling among a number of repre-
sentatives of the ILO was that still more should be done in
the area of job security. In 1974, it was proposed by the
Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations that this matter should once again come
before the ILO. By 1979 the ILO's governing body designated
Recommendation 119 as an instrument deserving priority;
within two years, the General Conference had adopted the
first draft of the new Instruments.
Thus, in June 1982 the ILO approved Convention 158,
Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer. 11 One hundred and twenty-six countries voted on
whether to adopt the Convention. Only nine representatives
voted against adoption.12 In eight of the nine instances, it
was only the employers' representative that voted against
adoption. The United States was the only country whose
qovernment representative also voted against adoption.
The Convention comprised three parts. Parts I and II
related to issues involved in cases of individual discharge.
Part III, a source of much discontent for a number of
t· 13 d' t' f I hcoun r1es, concerne term1na 10n 0 emp oyment suc as
workforce reductions imposed for economic or technological
or for reasons of corporate structure.
9
The guarantee of job security contained in Article 4 is
the cornerstone of the Convention. The Article is fundamen-
Convention applies to all branches of economic activity and
to all employed persons.15 Article 2(2) permits a number of
categories of workers to be excluded from coverage, including
workers under limited duration contracts,16 workers serving a
tally a reiteration of Article 2(1) of Recommendation 119,
which provided for dismissal only when related to the
capacity of the worker or when based on the operational
requirements of the undertaking. Article 5 acts to further
define Article 4 and lists several reasons ratifying
countries should not accept as valid bases for termination,
including factors such as union membership or activity,
seeking office or acting as a worker's representative, filing
complaints against the employer for breach of law or regula-
tions, the worker's race, sex, color, or religion, and
absence from work due to maternity leave. Article 6 touches
on the issue of absence from one's place of employment due to
temporary illness and provides that such "shall not con-
stitute a valid reason for dismissal." The Article leaves it
to the various states to determine by their national law and
practice on the specific of this particular area of protec-
tion.
The scope of the protection is restricted to discharge,
whether affecting individuals or groups of workers, and does
not extend to activities such as promotion, hiring, etc.14
"ThisAs for the extent of coverage, Article 2 states:
providing that workers should be entitled to a period of
notice or payment in lieu thereof unless termination is the
result of serious misconduct. Article 12 provides for a
10
The Con-
In the same year, Recommendation 166 concerning Termina-
24tion of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer was
severance allowance and other forms of income protection.
adopted. It was designed to appease various nations who felt
on the employer or to distribute it evenly. Part II pertain-
left up to the ratifying countries to either place the burden
the employee should never have to bear the onus alone. It is
Article 9 deals with the burden of proof and provides that
Articles 7 and 9 concern procedural rights to be accorded
ing to individual dismissals concludes with Article 11
right to appeal "within a reasonable period of time after
termination. 23
unfair should be able to challenge by appealing to an
"impartial bOdy."22 The worker is required to exercise his
allegations made against him "unless the employer cannot
reasonably be expected to provide this opportunitY"i21
an employee. The employee due to be dismissed for alleged
workers who believe their termination was arbitrary and
misconduct should be given an opportunity to respond to
b· . d 17 d 1 k 18pro atlon perlo, an casua temporary wor ers.
workers in enterprises where the size or nature of the under-
20taking mitigates against coverage.
vention also makes provision for the exclusion of workers
with equal or greater protection from another source19 and
11
Recommendations of the ILO are in the nature of
Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of unfair dis-
Conventions themselves cannot in the final
missal law. This hesitancy is not merely the product of
most loathe to comply with a great deal of ILO suggestions.
in the work. The United States has been one of the countries
activity in the unfair dismissal arena, as will be seen later
Most Western European countries seem to regard their ILO
that consequently their intent cannot be said to hinge upon
justice to protect workers against arbitrary termination and
the state of economic development of the particular country
, 1 d 28~nvo ve •
obligations seriously and have reacted positively to ILO
assertions of acceptable and practically attainable stand-
ards.27 It is argued. that the ILO standards on unfair
dismissal involve merely the application of basic notions of
it is contended by scholars that the Recommendations and Con-
ventions are not high level goals to aim at, but rather
analysis be enforced against member nations unlike, for
example, EEC directives as between member states.26 However,
'd l' 25gu~ e ~nes.
D. The Influence of ILO Activity
tion in ratifying countries. Throughout the course of this
occasional regard to the Recommendation.
work, reference will be made to the Convention, with
the Convention, were too radical to be incorporated into the
Convention, which is intended to directly influence legis la-
that some proposals, although similar in nature to those in
12
stubbornness on the part of the United States, but largely
the result of the legal history surrounding the employment
contract in the country.
13
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CHAPTER IV
UNFAIR DISMISSAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Development of the At Will Rule
In the United States the general rule as regards the
employment relationship is that either party can terminate
the association "for good cause, for no cause, or even for
1cause morally wrong." This is commonly called the at will
rule.
To fully understand the American rule, an investigation
of the traditional English rule is appropriate. Originally
it was presumed that employment contracts of indefinite
length were to be of a year's duration, unless there was
evidence to the contrary. Although the idea originated from
the exigencies of the agricultural work-year, it was ul-
timately not limited to such. Even so, factors such as trade
custom, notice period, and frequency of payment periods could
alter the presumption. Even as late as 1823, it was criminal
in England for an employee to prematurely terminate his
2employment contract.
The Industrial Revolution changed the status of the
employment association from a quasi-family relationship to a
more strictly economic one where the duration of service
depended on the dictates of product demand.3 The
"[m]aximization of wealth required that producers be free to
15
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contract for labor on the value their product could command
in the market place."4
In the United States there was a great lack of uniformity
and no reported cases of the application of the English
rule.5 A fair number of courts used the presumption that the
time period fixed for wage payment was the supposed duration
of the contract. Most courts, however, did not use the
presumption and merely took into consideration all the
relevant circumstances, such as custom, prior dealings, etc.6
The idea was prevalent that the duration of the contract
"depended on the understanding and intent of the parties,
which could be ascertained only by inference from their writ-
ten and oral negotiations, the wages of the business, the
situation of the parties, the nature of the employment and
all the circumstances of the case."7
In 1877, in a Treatise on the law of master and servant,
Horace G. Wood stated: "With us, the rule is inflexible that
a general or indefinite hiring is "prima facie" a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof."8
This was obviously a major departure from the above mentioned
case law of the day, yet Wood's "misstatement" was latched
onto by the courts for a number of reasons.
Some cases cited the unsettled and widely contrary state
of law as one of the reasons Wood's rule was generally
adopted. 9 Other scholars claimed the exigencies of laissez-
faire economic theory made an adoption of Wood's rule
17
necessary. 10 The idea was that both parties should contract
on equal terms and that the contract should reflect nothing
more than their mutually agreed upon terms. Some courts
claimed the rule should be accepted on the basis that it
benefited the employees every bit as much as it did the
employers in that workers could claim their pro rata wage for
work done, without having to labor the duration of the con-
tract as it was determined by the courts.11 Yet other
scholars gave further reasons. Feinman says the rule was an
"adjunct to the development of advanced capitalism in
America" and necessary to endow industrial owners with ab-
solute control of their businesses.12 Very few jurists gave
Wood's rule credit for stemming from valid abstract legal
reasoning but rather asserted "•.•the alacrity with which the
courts accepted Wood's Rule clearly had more to do with the
imperatives of economic history than the persuasiveness of
Wood's scholarship.,,13
In a sense, the at will rule was elevated to the status
of a property right with constitutional protection in the
cases of Adair v. United States14 and Coppage v. Kansas.1S
Here the court thwarted an attempted infringement of the at
will rule by invalidating a state legislative attempt to
prohibit discharge for union membership. The attempt was
proscribed as violative of due process in that it was an
interference with the "right of a purchaser of labor to
prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor
from the person offering to sell it.,,16
18
1. The Extent of the At Will Rule Today
While the rigidity of Adair and Coppage has been somewhat
softened today, South Dakota is the only state within the
United States to enact a law significantly restricting the at
will doctrine per see A person on an annual salary is
presumed to have been hired for a year in South Dakota. To
be legally terminated within that period, the employer must
be able to show "habitual neglect or continued incapacity to
perform or willful breach of duty by the employee."17
The result is that today in the United States, besides
statutory discrimination law and some other special purpose
statutes, there is no general statute which alters the basic
rule. Throughout the country, virtually all non-union
private sector employees are at will workers, often subject
to every whim of the employer.18 The at will rule is ob-
viously, by its very nature, a concept diametrically opposed
to that contained in Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 or 1982.
It was this patent contradiction in dismissal law ideology
that ensured that the United States was the only country
whose government representative voted against the above men-
tioned Convention.
B. The Development of Exceptions
While the at will doctrine was and largely still is the
general rule, there has at least been some statutory and
judicial behavior which has brought the United States more in
line with ILO standards. The erosion of the strict applica-
tion of the at will rule began with defined groups of
19
employees. These groups comprised people such as civil ser-
vants and employees represented by trade unions. Histori-
cally discriminated against classes were also among the first
to receive general protection in some areas of the employment
relationship.
In 1912, federal employees were granted protection by the
Lloyd-La Follette Act in that "cause" was required for their
d' , 1 19 , h' b ' . d d1sm1ssa. In t1me t 1S aS1C protect10n was ext en e to
all civil servants, whether on the federal, state or local
level.
Employees represented by trade unions were given early
protection too. In 1937, in the case of NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel corp.,20 the Supreme Court upheld the National
Labor Relations Act. This ultimately cut into the at will
rule in two ways. First, employees could not be fired for
union activity and, second, the Act protected the right of
employees to engage in collective bargaining that would limit
managerial discretion in terminating employees. In its
statutory protection of unionized workers, the United States
is in compliance with Article 5 of the Convention which lists
"union membership or participation in union activities" as an
invalid reason for termination.
However, even to this day, it is only these two above
mentioned groups that have general "for cause" protection
against unjust dismissal which would perhaps comply with ILO
standards. While it is probably true that the "[d]evelopment
of labor law around collective bargaining relieved social and
20
political pressure to change the law of individual employment
1 t' h' ,,21,. 11 h h' d 1re a ~ons ~ps, ~t ~s equa y true t at t ~s eve opment
exerted a large measure of influence on judges when it came
to their willingness to accept the validity of lawyers at-
tempts to convince them that there were necessary common law
exceptions to the at will rule.22 And so, while this work
will generally not be looking at employment protection of
public sector workers and those covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements in the United States, it is important to
realize th~ role these two groups played in the erosion of
the unbending application of the at will rule. The statutes
granting workers protection against discriminatory firings
will be analyzed later, but these statutes too were obviously
instrumental in making some judges more amenable to recogniz-
ing "judicial exceptions" to the at will rule. While it is
generally true that the primary source of exceptions was
statutory law, there were some early cases that permitted
recovery for wrongful dismissal by allowing the plaintiff to
prove facts that today would suffice for recovery in more
liberal jurisdictions which recognize implied in fact con-
tracts for employment tenure.23 It is pertinent at this
stage, therefore, to begin an inquiry in the present day
judicial exceptions to the at will rule in the United States
and to discover the role they have played in diminishing the
problem of unfair dismissal in the country. By so doing, it
can be determined to what extent, if at all, these decisions
21
a. In contract.
under a lot of criticism.
One writer sees thet ' f ,,,25wo prom1ses or 0 many prom1ses.
for and given as the agreed equivalent of one promise or of
it: "A single and undivided consideration may be bargained
sideration is contrary to the now accepted rule that one con-
'd ' 1 ,24 b'S1 erat10n may support severa prom1ses or as Cor 1n puts
Critics argue that the requirement of independent con-
For such a promise to be enforceable, the employee would
A historical corollary of the at will rule was the
"permanent" contracts were involved, the courts construed
employment. This stringent application of this rule has come
this to mean merely a steady job as opposed to temporary
for his wages or salary. These objections were until
services, because these were deemed to be only "quid pro quo"
recently consistently applied, except where the contract was
of definite and stipulated duration. Where "lifetime" or
lack of mutuality of obligation or for lack of independent
have to provide consideration beyond the renderence of his
"life-long" employment was unenforceable because of either a
employer promised to terminate for cause only.
proposition that an employer's promise of "permanent" or
unenforceability would also pertain to instances where the
1. Judicial Exceptions
ards.
consideration in return for such promise. This notion of
have brought the United States more in line with ILO stand-
22
rule traditionally applied by the courts as the result of
confusion of certain aspects of the parol evidence rule and
the law of contract.26
Courts that today still strictly apply the independent
consideration rule are at odds as to what exactly constitutes
independent consideration. Some would say that it is suffi-
cient that the employee gave up another job,27 or relo-
cated,28 while others would directly disagree.29
A number of jurisdictions have now rejected the rigid
independent consideration rule30 and have asserted that the
consideration and mutuality issues are, as in all other con-
tracts, subsumed under the heading of contract construction
and are not rules of substance.3l Other courts still refuse
to enforce employer promises of job security unless some
additional consideration, above and beyond service, has been
given. On occasion however, a fairly wide interpretation is
. h . f . d d t .d . 32g~ven to t e requ~rement 0 ~n epen en cons~ erat~on.
The requirement was, and in many circumstances still is,
a hindrance when it comes to satisfying certain jurisdictions
that there has been a valid express or implied in fact
contractual exception to the at will rule.33
i. Express or Implied in Fact Contractual Exceptions
Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to speak of an express
or implied in fact contract which provides some form of job
security as being an "exception" to the at will rule.
is involved here is an attempt on the part of
the employer to show that the at will rule was not operative
23
at all; that the employer had given up. This "exception" to
the at will rule is probably the least controversial judicial
exception and is fairly uniformly applied in states that
recognize judicial exceptions at all.
Such employment contracts limiting the power to terminate
at will can be the result either of direct expressions of
such a term or of terms implied by words, conduct or in some
other way.
Oral Representations.
Occasionally, a direct oral promise can be shown to have
curtailed an employer's right to fire at will. In the case
of Terrio v. Millnocket Community Hospita134 there was an
oral statement by the agent of the employer that the plain-
tiff was secure in her job "for the rest of her life.,,35 The
court relied on this statement and declared that "her long
service in a position of substantial authority .••provided the
critical evidentiary support for her contract claim.,,36 The
court accordingly declared that she could not be terminated
without just cause.
Usually, however, plaintiffs can rarely rely on such
direct assurances of job security and are forced to convince
the court that the employer's words contained the implication
of job security.
One of the leading cases in this regard is the case of
Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan.37 In this
case, the plaintiff employee alleged that he was told that he
would be with the company "as long as I did my job,,,38 but
-------------------------
24
admitted that no mention had been made of "just cause" or of
the need for "satisfactory" work. The Michigan Supreme Court
instructed the jury that it could conclude that the
employer's words meant that "the employer has agreed to give
up his right to discharge at will without assigning cause and
may discharge only for cause."39 The court handled the
consideration issue by stating that "the employee's action or
forbearance in reliance upon the employer's promise con-
stitutes sufficient consideration to make the promise legally
binding. "40 The court had found an implied assurance of job
security sufficient to be considered part of the employment
contract itself.
Similarly, in the case of Robago-Alvarez v. Dart In-
dustries, Inc.,41 an implied promise of job security was
found when the plaintiff testified as to the lengths the
company had gone to make her leave her former place of
employment and to the fact that she was assured her job at
the company would be "permanent." She alleged that she was
told that Dart Industries did not fire arbitrarily, but only
for "just cause."42 The California Court of Appeals con-
cluded that these statements were sufficient to remove
Robago-Alvarez from the at will class of employees.
While oral assurances of job security are fairly
commonly accepted by some courts as removing the power to
fire at will, problems of proof and recollection remain,
particularly if the employee has been employed for a long
time. More and more lately, employees are turning to written
25
materials such as personnel handbooks and to company practice
to convince courts that their employment may be terminated
only with cause.
Non-Verbal Representations.
1972' th f P . d 43 hIn 1n e case 0 erry v. S1n erman, t e court
found a college professor could not be terminated where the
employee handbook to which he was subject gave a different
impression. This was probably one of the first "personnel
handbook" decisions and sparked off a very controversial
means of granting relief to employees terminated without
cause.
Traditionally, handbooks had never been considered part of
the employment contract because of the power of the employer
to unilaterally amend its contents and because the employee
hardly ever gave independent consideration for the terms
contained therein.44 Indeed, writers have criticized certain
courts for finding agreements to limit the at will rule
"under circumstances that would probably garner a first-year
contracts student an F for saying that a contract was formed
at all."45
Some cases do provide a fairly concrete basis for finding
a contractual obligation. For example, in Weiner v. McGraw-
Hill, Inc.,46 the employment application stated specifically
that the employment would be subject to the terms of the com-
pany handbook. Weiner, a high level employee, had been told
to follow the handbook guidelines when he himself terminated
employees. The court here had no hesitation in finding
26
Weiner's discharge contrary to the terms of the manual and a
reason for recourse.
The other extreme is exemplified by the case of Novosel v.
47Sears, Roebuck & Co •• Here the application form specifi-
cally stated that termination could take place at any time
and for any reason. The court held the handbook did not
create any contractual obligation.
Most attempted uses of the manual provisions are not that
1 t h Th T· t 48 ...c ear cu owever. e OU1ssan case 1S aga1n 1mportant
in this regard. Here, on the basis independent from the
aforementioned oral assurances, the court also relied upon
the personnel policy manual to find a contractual agreement
not to terminate without cause. The manual stated that it
was "policy" to release an employee "for just cause only.II49
The court found that since the company had adopted such a
policy and had established certain procedures by which to
effectuate it, and since it had made known the policy to its
employees, it had committed itself to just cause discharge
with the proper procedures.SO
The court defended its holding by stating that "[i]f there
is in effect a policy to dismiss for just cause only, the
employer may not depart from that policy on whim, simply
because he was under no obligation to institute the policy in
the first place.IISl
The court even went so far as to say, in dicta, that
employer statements of policy in the form of guidelines and
manuals can give rise to contractual rights of employee's
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without evidence of mutual agreement on the terms thereof,
and even if the employee learns of the guidelines after the
h .. 52lrlng.
The case of Pine River State Bank v. Mettille53 also
accepted the binding nature of certain representations in
personnel handbooks, but was careful to distinguish between
statements of general policy and the offer of specific
rights. It concluded that vague and general policy state-
ments were not specific enough to form a legally binding
offer; nevertheless, specific terms could be construed to
h· h t b' d' 54w lC accep ance was ln lng.
Even where an employee has been fired for just cause, his
termination may be held to be violative of the contractual
undertaking if the procedure outlined in the manual has not
been followed. In Yartzoff v. Democratic-Herald Publishing
Co.55 the handbook promised progressive discipline "in most
cases." The court found that if the employee could prove his
contentions, he could make out a case against the employer.
Occasionally the courts are prepared to go beyond the
policy expressed in manuals and to accept alleged past
practice as a sufficient indicium of company policy. In the
case Hepp v. Lockheed-California co.,56 the plaintiff, in a
non-union company, claimed it was the practice of the
employer to give laid-off workers preference when it came to
rehiring. After Hepp claimed he had been laid off without
preference, the California Appeals Court said that if he
could prove the existence of such a policy; that he knew of
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such practice and that he had relied on such practice to his
detriment, he could enforce his claim as a matter of con-
tract.57
The case of Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.58 went so far as
to say that besides oral and non-verbal assurances of job
security, besides past practice, factors such as longevity of
service could be considered in determining whether there
exists an implied in fact promise for continued employment.
The case is significant in that it considered an extraneous
factor such as longevity of service as contributing to the
establishment of an implied in fact contract, stating "the
employer's conduct gave rise to an implied promise that it
would not act arbitrarily in dealing with its employees.
Usually longevity of service would be a factor in assessing
whether or not the implied in law covenant of good faith had
been breached.
We have thus seen how verbal and non-verbal expressions
can impliedly become part of the employment contract and, in
many situations, limit the employer's power to fire at will.
The courts have, by recognizing such an exception, obviously
limited employer discretion to some extent and "ipso facto"
brought the United States somewhat more in line with
Article 4 of the ILO Convention. What is essentially
being witnessed, however, is an extensive judicial effort
to discover isolated instances where the employer's power to
fire at will could be said to have been contractually cur-
tailed. Even the court's efforts in this regard have not
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been without criticism. Despite this theory being the
object of much criticism from both employers and some legal
scholars, it presents less of a threat to the employers
than the next two theories which will be considered. Here,
the writer perrit states,59 the employer himself planted
the seeds of liability and ultimately has only himself to
blame. Employee job security under this theory is the
result of reliance on the positive representations, however
made, of the employer. However, liability does not always
spring from so controllable a source. Often the law
itself asserts that certain terms are necessarily part of
the employment contract, whether specifically agreed to or
not.
ii. Implied In Law ie. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
Section 205 of the Contracts Restatements states that:
"Every contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and in its enforce-
ment."60 The Uniform Commercial Code also stipulates that
the covenant be part of every commercial contract61 and the
principle has been expounded in case law for many years.62
While the covenant had long been applied to insurance con-
tracts, its applicability to employment contracts was a
source of difficulty in light of the at will rule. The
extension of the covenant to express employment contracts of
definite duration63 or to situations where there was a
promise of retention64 where work was done "satisfactorily,"
30
was no major departure from accepted practice. However, the
application of the covenant to pure at will contracts was a
different matter. It was originally thought that once the
employer decided to discharge the employee, the contract,
including the implied covenant, came to an end. It was with
the seminal case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.65 that certain
jurisdictions began to use the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing as a direct limitation on the employer's power
to fire at will.
Before we consider the various interpretations the courts
have placed upon the covenant in the employment context, it
is necessary to allude to the disagreement prevalent in most
jurisdictions on whether an action based on the covenant lies
in contract or in tort. This inquiry is relevant to the
damages issue. Compensation for pain and suffering and puni-
tive damages are generally not available in actions based on
contract.
Calamari and Perillo see the covenant remedy as concep-
tually on the borderline between tort and contract and assert
that n[i]t is a non-contractual obligation that used to be
treated procedurally as if it were a contract.n66 There is
still extensive division among the different courts as to the
exact nature of the action.
The Connecticut Court in 1980 saw it sounding purely in
67contract law. The covenant was treated simply as an im-
plied term which had been breached. The Montana Supreme
Court, on the other hand, says that the actions sounds purely
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in torts and that punitive damages are avai1ab1e.68 It
argued that although the duty arose from the employment
relationship, it existed apart from the contract.
In the case of Cleary v. American Airlines69 the
California Court found that the employer was obligated to
act in good faith by both the covenant and a resultant but
separately existing duty and that breach sounded both in tort
and in contract.
While the issue of the exact legal classification is sig-
nificant as far as remedies go, it is of less importance in
considering the extent to which it limits managerial discre-
tion to fire at will.
There is a wide variety of opinions as to what employer
actions are considered violative of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Even within certain jurisdictions
themselves there is often little unanimity. In the early
covenant cases such as the Monge case and the Petermann
case,70 no real limit to the scope of the implied covenant
was suggested. The court merely asserted that the covenant
was breached where the employee was terminated in "bad faith
or malice or based on retaliation,,71 and it was left to the
jury to decide what constituted this breach of faith. The
protection offered to employees here was potentially very
broad and courts in some jurisdictions took fright. In New
York, the Court of Appeals in Murphy v. American Home
Products rejected outright the implied covenant theory saying
that "[i]t would be incongruous to say that an inference may
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be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a provision
h' h ld b d t t' f h' 'h ft' . 72w 1C wou e es ruc 1ve 0 1S r1g t 0 erm1nat10n.
Between these two poles one could possibly place the case
of Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet.73 Here the court recog-
nized the possibility of recovery under the implied covenant,
but proceeded to restrict its application to instances where
the dismissals were "contrary to a fundamental and well-
defined public policy as embodied by existing law.,,74
As can be seen from the above case, there is some overlap
and blurring of distinction between the implied covenant
cases and the public policy tort exception cases to be con-
sidered later. The case of Petermann v. Teamsters where a
Teamster was granted relief after being terminated after
refusing to commit perjury, is sometimes considered the semi-
nal "public policy exception" case, but was resolved on con-
tract grounds.
The Beebe case was probably the first true "covenant"
case. In this case a female employee was fired after refus-
ing to respond to the sexual advances of her foreman. The
court found the dismissal "•••not in the best interests of
the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
76breach of the employment contract."
This was followed by the Massachusetts case of Fortune v.
National Cash Register.77 Here the employee was fired to
prevent his collecting a $90,000 commission which was owed to
him. The court simply declared that when a commission was to
be paid for work performed by an at will employee, the
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decision to terminate must be made in good faith. The court
had used the covenant to fashion a remedy against a specific
employer abuse.
A case which was the source of much alarm among employees,
particularly in California was that of Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc.78 The significance of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was expanded enormously. Here
the employee claimed that he had been terminated without
legal cause after eighteen years of satisfactory service.
The court concluded that longevity of service and the
employers adoption of a regulation that provided for an im-
partial hearing when the employee protested adverse personnel
decisions, led to the conclusion that the covenant should
apply and that the employer could not terminate "without good
cause."79 The case was disturbing to many in the sense that
the court took the covenant to mean that discharge without
good cause after lengthy service was ipso facto indicative of
a breach of the covenant. It almost imposed on employers a
good cause standard in regard to what were once pure at will
employees.
While the Californian courts were giving this expansive
reading to the covenant, the court in New Hampshire was
retreating from the liberal stance it had adopted in the
Monge case. In Cloutier v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
80Co., the court demanded that not only should there be
evidence of bad faith, but that at the same time, there
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should be a violation of public policy sufficient to con-
stitute a separate tort.
The Montana courts have been fairly active in granting
employees relief by means of the covenant. In Gates v. Life
of Montana Insurance co.,81 the court rejected the
proposition that the personnel handbook formed part of the
employment contract itself on the grounds that it was issued
two years after the decision to hire and no independent con-
sideration had been given. However, the court found that the
employer was bound to follow the terms of the manual as a
matter of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In
Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital,82 the Montana Supreme
Court unanimously found that even a probationary employee was
owed a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
While the covenant theory of restricting arbitrary dis-
missal is fairly restricted as far as ILO standards are con-
cerned and available only in certain jurisdictions throughout
the United States, it is potentially very far reaching, as
83can be seen by the Cleary case. Some legal scholars go so
far as to say all common law theories used by the courts in
the United States to restrict at will power should be sub-
sumed under tortious breach of contract, i.e., the implied
84covenant theory.
Others point to the problems involved if there is good
faith in a discharge but no "just cause" and stress the dif-
ficulties in the factual ascertainment of the employer's mo-
t. 851ves.
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The implied covenant theory is far more practical a tool
with which to impose a good cause standard than the implied
in fact contractual exceptions examined earlier in this work.
For while the latter theory required the courts to find the
source of liability in the employer's own representations,
the covenant theory potentially allows the courts to deter-
mine an acceptable standard. It remains to be seen whether
the courts will use the covenant theory to bring the United
States more in line with the spirit of Article 4 of the 1982
Convention and the legislation in this regard in many in-
dustria1ized countries.
iii. Promissory Estoppel
Another legal doctrine which is occasionally utilized
to provide relief from arbitrary employer behavior is that of
promissory estoppel. Defined in section 90 of the Restate-
86ments, it is invoked in circumstances in which courts
conclude that it would be unfair for someone who has made a
, I D' l' C d f D' t 87promlse to renege. n U lsse- upo v. Boar 0 lrec ors,
the court held that a teacher, whose contract was not
renewed, had stated causes of action for promissory estoppel
for both failure to renew her contract and failure to rehire
her in another position. She alleged that she had
detrimentally relied on the principal's oral assurances and a
posted notice that all present faculty members would be
retained for the next year.
Other courts have concluded that the doctrine in no way
detracts from an employer's right to terminate at wi11.88
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b. In Tort
i. The Public Policy Exception
The tort doctrine provides the alternative common law
mode of relief from arbitrary dismissal. Blades, in a 1967
law review article, was the first to suggest that the courts
draw from tort theory to develop the new tort of abusive
discharge.89 Blades criticized the incongruity of the sub-
stantial protection offered private citizens against the
abuse of government power in view of the rapid developments
in constitutional law areas in the 1950's and 1960's and the
complete lack of protection afforded workers against their
private sector employers.
He saw possible contractual remedies as too difficult to
achieve, and was convinced that state and federal
legislatures would not rise to the challenge. Consequently,
Blades suggested a tort remedy concentrating on wrongful
motives as a mode of relief. What eventually emerged from
this was the "public policy exception" to the at will rule.
The seminal public policy exception case could be said to
be that of Peterman v. Teamsters in 1959.90 Although the
action was brought sounding in contract, the court found the
Teamsters' employee's discharge for refusal to commit perjury
actionable, saying "[t]he public policy of this state •.•would
be seriously impaired if it were to be held that one could be
d' h d b f h' fIt ' . 911SC arge y reason 0 1S re usa 0 comm1t perJury.
Subsequent public policy exception cases were almost unani-
mously held by state courts to sound in tort.
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The disharmony among the various states as to recognition
of the doctrine of the public policy exception and as to its
scope, is as broad as the disagreement in regard to the im-
plied covenant theory. On the one hand, there are cases such
as the Cloutier case92 where the court said, in regard to the
determination of public policy, that it was "best to allow
the citizenry, the institution of the American jury, to
strike the appropriate balance in these difficult cases."93
On the other hand, there is the case of Murphy v. American
Home products94 where the New York Court of Appeals, while
rejecting the implied covenant theory, simultaneously flatly
refused to recognize the tort of abusive discharge, contend-
ing that the legislature was better equipped than the courts
to consider the competing policy positions of various groups
in society. Most instances would obviously fall between
these two poles, and the court would be permitted as a matter
of law to determine the public policy of the state.
Even within the states that do recognize the public policy
exception, there are wide variances on the criteria for
determining the particular public policy at issue. Some
courts are perfectly at ease themselves defining public
policy by examining legislation, administrative rules, judi-
cial decisions and even professional codes of ethics.95
Other courts would impose more rigid a criterion and demand
that the public policy be evidenced either by the
Constitution or by a statute and that, additionally, the
employee point out a right attributable to him as a worker.96
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this doctrine would be the refusal to take a lie detector
The first of these circumstances is where the employee
99In Savodnick v. Korvettes, Inc. the court found
be where he was terminated for satisfying a legal obligation
doctrine could come to the aid of an at will employee would
The second set of circumstances in which the public policy
test where state statutory law does not condone an employer's
. h h th . h .. lb' 102rJ.gt to use suc or e rJ.g t to )oJ.n a a or unJ.on.
Other examples of rights protected from infringement under
tion as well as in ERISA. Other courts have held differently
th .. 101on J.S J.ssue.
a "strong public policy ...favoring the protection of in-
tegrity in pension plans"lOO embodied in the state constitu-
Despite the differences as to criteria, it is generally
public policy and therefore supporting a suit for wrongful
discharge.
landlord and tenant cases, but also found the action to be a
discharge to avoid paying pension benefits as violative of
violation of public policy. Some jurisdictions have viewed
tion claim. The court based its findings on analogies from
for wrongful discharge had been stated where an employee
claimed she had been fired for filing a workman's compensa-
right to which he or she was entitled. In Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co.98 it was held that a cause of action
employees can have recourse to the public policy exception to
the at will rule.97
claims he was terminated merely because he exercised a legal
accepted that there are three basic situations in which
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placed upon him. One of the most significant cases in this
area is that of Nees v. Hocksl03 where an employee was fired
because of her refusal to seek to be excused from jury duty.
The court held that a duty giving rise to tort liability was
implied from the public policy in favor of jury service. The
plaintiff was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.
In Alabama, however, the Supreme Court found in Bender Ship
Repair, Inc. v. Stevensl04 that statutory protection from
loss of usual compensation while serving on a grand jury did
not stretch so far as to evidence a public policy against
such discharge.
Another example of where protection is offered under this
heading is in cases where patient care employees are required
by statute to report instances of patient abuse and neglect.
Occasionally employees are successful,105 but courts are
often hesitant to read into such statutes a restriction on
the at will rule.106
The third instance in which recognizing the public policy
exception would come to the assistance of the terminated
worker is where the latter was discharged for his refusal to
further an illegality. In the Pennsylvania case of Geary v.
U. S. Steel corp.,lOS the plaintiff was discharged when he
objected to the safety of a particular product which was
ultimately withdrawn. The court, while recognizing the
validity of the public policy exception, found on the facts
that Geary had made a nuisance of himself and that there was
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no public safety threat and that no public policy was impli-
cated.
The employee was more successful in Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. Citing the non-essentiality of a statute to
reflect public pOlicy, the court offered relief to a worker
terminated for refusal to participate in a price-fixing
scheme stating: "[AJn employer's obligation to refrain from
discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal
act •••reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in
order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied
in the state's penal statutes.,,109 Relief is offered
employees in analogous situations such as where there are
consumer and competitor protection lawsllO or where there are
refusals to violate administrative regulationslll or a
professional code of ethics.
In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,112 a quality
control director was fired after telling an employer about
underweight materials and substandard raw materials in its
food products. State law required accurate labeling and
licensing. The court ruled for Sheets, reasoning that he
should not have to choose between criminal sanction and
employment. In another case, an employee was offered relief
when he, a radiographer, was fired after refusing to operate
a unit utilizing live radioactive cobalt in violation of
Nuclear Regulatory Commission standards.113 The Indiana
Supreme Court in Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co.,114 tried to
limit the scope of the public policy exception as it
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pertained to refusals to further an illegality by limiting
claims to firings in retaliation either for following a
statutorily prescribed duty or for exercising a statutory
right.
While the above mentioned aspect of the public policy
exception is used by some states, a number of jurisdictions
have legislatively protected the employment status to report
their employers to authorities for violations of law or
regulations. These whistle-blowing statutes are really a
"variant of statutory anti-retaliation provisions that appear
in specific contexts"115 such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1967.
The federal government passed a whistle-blower statute
, f d 1 1 116 h'l ' , h'protectlng e era emp oyees, w 1 e Connectlcut, M1C 19an
d ' 117 h "1 t t t' 1 tan Malne ave Slml ar s atu es pro ectlng emp oyees a
large. California, Indiana, Louisiana, Texas and
washingtonl18 have whistle-blower acts applying to state
employees only. These statutes typically provide statutory
redress in the event of any employee being discharged when he
or she, in good faith, reports what he or she has reasonable
cause to believe constitutes an employer violation of federal
or state law. These statutes are very significant in that
they comprise one of the very few statutory limitations on
the at will rule not aimed at a particular type of dis-
crimination. As one writer put it: "These statutes may be
considered on the cutting edge of developing employment-at-
'II ' "119Wl exceptlons.
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On occasions a number of discharged employees have tried
to use the public policy exception to circumvent procedural
limitations imposed on circumstances that would otherwise
entitle them to statutory relief. Employees attempt to in-
voke the policies encapsulated in these statutes in contexts
outside the reach of the statutes themselves. The majority
of courts have held the statutory remedy to be exclusive and
to preclude a common law wrongful discharge action.120 But
in Williamson v. Provident State Bank121 a woman, demoted
from her position as president of a small bank because of the
perceived need to have a "man up front," could not bring a
Title VII action because the bank had fewer than fifteen
employees. She brought a common law action alleging that the
discharge violated Maryland's public policy. The court did
grant her relief citing the statute as evidence of the public
policy at issue. A number of other cases have allowed
similar "circumventions."122
The public policy exception to the at will rule has forced
employers in certain jurisdictions to more closely analyze
their reasons for discharging employees. By the beginning of
1985 the courts in at least twenty-two of the states had
recognized this exception in some form or other.123 The
exception has been criticized by some in that the worker's
interest in his job is not the primary object of protec-
tion,124 that, for example, in Nees v. Hocks it is the jury
system that is being protected. The worker has to convince
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the court that it is in the public interest that he be
d' h' I t 125protecte ~n ~s emp oymen •
The public policy exception has also been criticized from
a number of other angles. For example, in situations where
the employee has been terminated for refusing to commit an
unlawful act, it is sufficient that the employee was in good
faith although the employer's directive was legal? What if
the employer reasonably believed his directive was legal?126
In whistle-blower cases, what if the accusation of
illegality turns out to be erroneous? In "exercise of right"
exceptions, as in the other two, there is the difficulty of
establishing criteria for determining public policy. One
frustrated commentator has suggested that all dismissals
without "just cause" be actionable because "no matter how
'private' their motivation, [they] undermine the communities
interest in economic productivity, stable employment and
fairness in the work place."127
As far as bringing the United States more in line with ILO
standards as espoused in Article 4 of the Convention is con-
cerned, the public policy exception has a limited potential.
Unless courts are willing to regard a firing without just
cause as per se violative of public policy, workers are only
going to find a modicum of relief in very restricted cir-
cumstances.
ii. Other Tort Remedies
While the public policy exception is the major form of
tort relief available to aggrieved employees, there are a
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number of miscellaneous tort remedies available to employees
when the public policy exception is not appropriate. These
can be invoked in addition to, or in the place of, wrongful
termination theories and may provide a remedy for an employee
even if the discharge is lawful.
1. "Prima Facie" Tort
This is less common but broader in concept than the
public policy tort and allows recovery where an employee is
dismissed with malice and no justification. Section 870 of
the Second Tort Restatements128 sets out the following essen-
tial elements: intentional infliction of harm; without ex-
cuse or justification; resulting in actual temporal damage;
not classifiable as any other tort. The elements seldom seem
to arise in wrongful discharge cases, but there have been a
number of instances, particularly in New York, where the
doctrine has been successfully called upon.129
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
This tort, defined in the Restatements,130 does not so
much to the dismissal per se but to the mode in which this is
effectuated. 'Since the outrage cannot be predicated on the
dismissal alone, the employee must show that the employer in-
tended to cause him or her distress or was reckless. An ex-
ample of the successful use of this mode of relief is Agis v.
Howard Johnson co.131 where a manager, unable to determine
who was stealing food, started firing waitresses in al-
phabetical order. Some courts have criticized the remedy on
the grounds that damages for emotional distress are available
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a wrongful discharge suit under the public policy excep-
tion.132
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
This is treated in Sections 766-767 of the Second Tort
The major difficulty here is in attempting
that the theory can be utilized against
to the contract which is allegedly being interfered
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
To recover on this ground, the employee must show a
isrepresentation; known to be false at the time of the
purpose of inducing another to act on
reliance; action in reliance on the statement and resu1t-
d 134 l' 'h'ld d ' I 135amage. In Ham 1n v. Fa1rc 1 s In ustr1es, nc.
plaintiff sued. the employer for fraudulent misrepresenta-
employer told the plaintiff that his job would
e permanent. The court found that, despite the fact that it
at will, the employee could sue if the
was made with no intent to perform. Some courts
otherwise on this point.136
Miscellaneous Theories
Other tort remedies occasionally called upon in discharge
are those of defamation, especially where
, 1 d 137, , f' 11are 1nvo ve, 1nvaS10n 0 pr1vacy, usua y
h' 139 h 1 f'l 140respect to 1S or er personne 1 es, con-
or negligence.
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2. Statutory Exceptions
As alluded to earlier, the erosion of the at will rule
began not with judicial exceptions in contract or in tort,
but by statutory protection of certain classes of employees.
Civil servants and members of trade unions were protected
from early on. It is, however, the unorganized private sec-
tor employee who is our present concern.
a. Federal Statutes
There are several federal statutes which do protect the
unorganized private sector employee against specific types of
discharge. Most of these statutes provide protection against
discrimination based on defined characteristics. This broad
protection began in the public sector in 1933 with the
"Unemployment Relief Act,,141 which prohibited certain types
of discrimination. Later, broader protection was offered by
E.O. 8587 of 1940142 which prohibited race and religious dis-
crimination in the federal civil service. In 1941, E.O.
8802143 prohibited discrimination based on race, creed, color
or national origin by employers who were granted war con-
tracts. Nondiscrimination in the civil service was ratified
by Congress in the Ramspeck Act.144 Today, there are at
least eight major federal statutory or regulatory enactments
which provide some form of protection against unfair dis-
missal. This work will consider a number of these statutes
from the point of view of unfair dismissal.
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i. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
h 145 h'b' d' '" th b . fT e act pro 1 1ts 1scr1m1nat10n on e aS1S 0 race,
color, sex, religion or national origin. It covers all
employers in industries affecting commerce if the employer
has fifteen or more employees as well as state and local
t 146 1 b 't' . h f'ftgovernmen s, a or organ1za 10ns W1t 1 een or more
members, labor organizations in industries affecting
147 d 1 t ,148commerce an emp oymen agenc1es.
Certain exemptions are provided for "bona fide" occupa-
tiona1 qualifications" linked to religion, sex or national
. , 149or1g1n.
A violation of Title VII is established wither by proving
150an intent to discriminate, I.e., disparate treatment, or
by proving that an employer policy has a disparate impact on
a racial, sexual or other defined group.151
Section 704(a)152 of the Act, an anti-retaliation provi-
sion, provides protection against dismissal where a worker is
disciplined for participation in administrative or judicial
hearings relating to an alleged Title VII violation. Workers
who have opposed any discriminatory practice that violates
Title VII are similarly protected from retaliatory firings.
If a worker is a victim of an unfair dismissal in vio1a-
tion of Title VII, the plaintiff can recover back pay for up
to two years before the date of filing of the initial charge.
This would include salary loss, compensation for lost over-
time, shift differential and fringe benefits. No punitive or
compensatory damages are avai1ab1e.153
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white citizens."
crimination on the basis of race and color and on the basis
160In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. the
employee, the employer is, in fact, interfering with that
missal in the sense that by discriminatorily discharging an
Section 1981 protection has application to unfair dis-
purely private acts of discrimination also.
The remedies resemble those provided for a violation of
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 provides that:
Once again, employers are permitted to discriminate on the
The term "white citizens" limits the Act's scope to dis-
Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 covers
territory to make and enforce contracts .••as is enjoyed by
Rights Act)
of citizenship.
iii. Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (Reconstruction Civil
"All •••persons shall have the same right in every state and
ii. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Act154 prohibits discrimination because of age
against persons over the age of forty. The Act applies to
basis of age where age is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion and to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority sys-
t 157em.
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Some courts have permitted
damages for pain and suffering and mental distress,158 though
most authority is to the contrary.159
all employers in an industry affecting commerce with twenty
155 156or more employees and to state and local governments.
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tions where workers are terminated in contravention of a
itself.
162v. Novotny the Supreme Court held that Section
Covered by the Act are any persons whose federal constitu-
The Act has application to unfair dismissal law in situa-
Damages are compensatory damages, including mental and
In the case of Great American Federal Savings and Loan As-
The Act provides that two or more persons may not conspire
the color of state law. The Act does not apply to violations
tiona1 rights are violated under the color of state law or
iv. Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (Civil Rights Act 1871)
the plaintiff of substantial federal rights afforded by the
v. Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1985 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871)
emotional distress, punitive damages and injunctive relief.
1985 extends to purely private conspiracies arising in the
sociation
under the color of federal law.
to deprive any person or class of persons of equal protection
guarantee of an exercise of their rights.
remedies include injunctive relief and monetary relief akin
to damages, including punitive damages.
person's right to "make and enforce" (employment) contracts
on the same footing as white citizens.
Section 1981 requires actual intent to discriminate161 and
of the law. There must be a conspiracy; intended to deprive
whose rights, guaranteed by federal law, are violated under
Constitution or a federal statute, other than Section 1985
employer-employee context. However, the plaintiff must be
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able to prove a class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the alleged conspiracy to discharge.163 The Act
has been successfully used in the employment context in cases
f d' h b d 164 1" 165 , 1 ,,166o lSC arge ase on sex, re 1910n, natl0na orlgln
167and age.
Relief can include out of pocket loss and compensation for
mental and emotional distress. The award can include puni-
tive damages.
vi. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Act168 prohibits discrimination against handicapped
individuals by federal contractors, recipients of federal
grants and participants in federal programs.
The scope of private right of action is very limited in
most jurisdictions,169 but the Third Circuit has adopted a
170wider interpretation in this regard.
Section 505 of the Act makes available the "remedies, pro-
cedures and rights" of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
vii. Executive Order 11246
E.O. 11246 requires Federal contractors to refrain from
employment discrimination and to develop affirmative action
plans. Most courts refuse to recognize a private right of
action for violation of the executive order.171 However, an
individual may be able to seek a mandamus to compel ad-
, , t t' t' 172mlnlS ra lve ac 10n.
As a result of these aforementioned statutes, it is in the
area of outlawing discrimination that the United States can
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be said to most comply with ILO standards. While obviously
none of the statutes contain the guarantee called for in
Article 4 of the Convention, they at least cover a number of
dismissals specifically outlawed in Article 5.
The limitations in coverage of a number of these statutes,
such as firm size, managerial level of the employee, etc. are
contrary to the general spirit of Article 2 which discourages
exemptions for those reasons.
Nevertheless, the resort to an independent body to solve
the problem and the favorable allocation of the proof burden
can at least be said to be in accordance with the gist of
Article 7 and Article 9 respectively.
b. State Statutes
There are extensive state statutes offering protection
similar similar to that outlined above on the state level.
New York, in 1945, was the first state to enact a Fair
Employment Practice Statute and by 1964 more than half the
states had such a statute.173
These statutes generally mirror the federal statutes, but
often extend the scope of protection even further. For ex-
ample, in California, the statute proscribes discrimination
on the basis of medical condition, political affiliation and
marital status among others.
About three-fifths of the states have, in addition to
F.E.P. laws, enacted provisions protecting an employee who
engages in civic duties such as jury service or voting.
There are also provisions relating to the right of
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association, the right to air one's political beliefs, etc.
Also included in state statutory enactments are various
anti-retaliatory provisions, covering a wide variety of laws.
These are in essence the same as the "whistle-blower" provi-
sions which have been considered earlier.
c. Federal and State Constitutions
Since historically the rights granted by the federal and
state constitutions have been effective only for government
employees in the employment context and a very few decisions
have extended their protection to private sector employees,
no attempt will be made to fully analyze their effect in this
context. However, Cornelius Peck of the University of
Washington argues that the federal constitution should be
construed to protect unorganized private sector employees
f .11 d' h 174 f h .f h d t throm at w~ ~sc arge. By use 0 t e F~ t an Four een
Amendments, by finding "state action" in a private employer's
discharge of his worker and by finding an absence of equal
protection from arbitrary discharge for unorganized private
sector employees, he concludes that these workers do have
constitutional protection. While his argument seems to stand
on rather flimsy ground, his approach is indicative of the
mood among many legal scholars today of the need to bring the
United States more in line with ILO standards by whatever
means possible.,
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C. Opinions of Various Writers on Unfair Dismissal Law in
the United States.
This paper has outlined, in quite some detail, the work-
ings of unfair dismissal law in the United States and the ex-
tent to which it falls short of the ILO guidelines and stand-
ards. There are within the United States today as many
opinions on the path the country should take in this regard
as there are legal scholars interested in the subject.
Opinions range from the countless number who deem a
statute the only solution for the inequities inherent in the
at will rule to those who strongly support the retention of
the pure at will rule. A major proponent of the statutory
response is Clyde Summers who summarized his views in a 1976
I . t' I 175 ... h h ld baw rev~ew ar ~c e. Ant~c~pat~ng t at t e courts wou e
slow to provide common law remedies, Summers proposed state
level legislation channeling unfair dismissal cases into the
arbitration process, in much the same way as in the organized
sector. He advocated the establishment of arbitration panels
for each state; the exclusion of organized and high level
employees from coverage; a six-month probationary period for
new employees with no exemption of small employers and
promoted the value of reinstatement as a remedy when ap-
propriate.
Other scholars have attempted to reach somewhat more of a
compromise between the present American manner of dealing
with the matter and the more demanding ILO standards. perrit
also advocates a statute, but suggests dismissals be made
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prima facie illegal only if based on characteristics such as
race, sex or age (i.e., the statutory exceptions); if based
on a conduct protected by clear public policy, including
policies embodied in the Constitution (i.e., the public
policy exception); if they violate employer promises (i.e.,
the implied-in-fact contractual exception) or if based on
private off-duty conduct.176 He also suggests use of the ar-
bitration procedure, the exclusion from coverage of organized
employees and reinstatement as a primary remedy.
At.the other pole are those who favor a return to the pure
at will theory or at least attempt to point out that its
merits exceed its demerits. Powers argues that further
erosion of the at will rule will lead to the need for exten-
sive structures to adjudicate on "just cause" issues in dis-
charge.177 He claims that it will lead to explicit expres-
sions of the at will nature of the employment in the
contracts; hirings for fixed terms, increased unionization
and shutdowns.178 He also argues that the at will rule may
help the employee find the employment most suited to him and
thereby increase productivity, efficiency and profits.
Finally, he argues that an unfair dismissal would be "another
step towards the legalization of American society."179
D. Politics of Statutory Reform
While legal scholars may debate over statutory and other
responses to the unfair dismissal problem, legislation is al-
most invariably the result of an extended process which cul-
minates in a balance of political power favoring change. At
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the moment in the United States activity for unfair dismissal
is in its early stages and the contrasting nature of the
various interest groups involved would not seem to facilitate
the situation.
1. Position of Non-Union Employees
First of all, there are the unorganized private sector
employees themselves. While this group is extremely
numerous,180 it is by its very nature "unorganized" and
largely legally ignorant. To exacerbate the situation there
are at will employees who have some degree of protection
anyway by nature of their position in their respective firms.
2. The Position of the Employers
Another interest group is obviously the employers them-
selves. Their position is eminently clear and was confirmed
by the employers' representative vote on the ILO Convention
of 1982. The group is also strong and well organized. While
the group as a whole may oppose limitations on their at will
power, it would seem that employers may prefer a statute in
the face of the ever-expanding exceptions to the at will
rule. For while the courts have often performed "a catalytic
function of inducing legislatures to act,,,181 employers fear
the unpredictability of the common law exceptions and the
high damages awards. And so ironically, it could occur that
in the near future advocating an unfair dismissal statute
could reflect a reactionary stance attempting to stem
unbridled judicial interference with the employment relation-
ship.
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3. The Positions of Trade Unions
It is commonly cited in the United States that trade
unions oppose unfair dismissal legislation on the grounds
that it would serve to undermine one of their primary func-
tions, namely the preservation of job security, and therefore
weaken their position in the labor field. In many instances
unions are suspicious of alternative methods to their
grievance procedures for, ironically, their "very
success •••providing those covered by collective bargaining
agreements has deadened their demands for general legislation
which would give to every employee the benefits which unions
h h' d b 11 t' b " "182ave ac 1eve y co ec 1ve arga1n1ng.
While it is really difficult to predict what the effect of
legislation would be on unions, a look at the experiences in
this regard in some foreign countries would be useful.
In Britain, where there has been unfair dismissal legisla-
tion since 1971, unionization is at sixty percent of the work
force and there was absolutely no decline in the role played
by unions as a result of the legislation has reduced the role
of the collective bargaining process. While unions still
handle their own grievances with regard to discharge, the
unions also process the grievances of non-unionized employees
as an organizational tactic to increase membership. In fact,
from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies, the unionization
rate rose thirty percent, in large because the threat of
employer retaliation against union activity (n the form of
discharge) was reduced by the legislation.184 In West
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Germany too, where legislation did not affect the role of
unions, assistance of non-unionized workers as an indication
of what unions could do for them is common.185
The European experience has shown that union protection is
always preferable to legislative protection anyway, and
workers never feel impelled to leave unions in the knowledge
that their position will be just as secure elsewhere.186
Despite the European experience in this regard, it would
probably be simplistic to say that one could draw absolute
conclusions occurrences there. Nevertheless, it is at least
an indication of some sort that unfair dismissal legis la-
t' 187 'f 't d ld t ff t '1on, 1 1 were ever passe , wou no a ec un10ns as
adversely as some would imagine. In fact, there are some
examples of organized labor supporting proposed unfair dis-
missal legislation. These instances, however, are few and
far between.
4. Positions of Other Interested Groups
There are other groups, such as the plaintiff's bar which
would obviously favor legislation as a means of increased
work and revenue, the defense bar which would have feelings
concurrent with those of the employers, and the academic
lawyers who have generally favored legislative initiatives to
grant rights to previously unprotected citizens.
The analysis undertaken thus far has concentrated almost
exclusively on unfair dismissal in the United States and on
how the law has measured to ILO demands and guidelines.
While it is obvious that the United States lags behind the
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standards demanded of it by the ILO, it is necessary to in-
vestigate a number of foreign examples to see how they have
responded to this issue. By so doing, it can at least be
established whether or not the ILO standards are realistic.
-
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CHAPTER V
A LOOK AT SOME FOREIGN EXAMPLES
A. EEC Activity
While the EEC has various directives in force relating to
group employment security, it has not yet entered the field
of individual protection against unfair dismissal.1 This is
largely because most EEC members regard the ILO standards as
guidelines for their own development in this regard. Among
the EEC countries, Belgium, France, West Germany, Ireland and
Italy all endorsed the 1982 Convention by having their
government workers' and employers' representatives vote in
favor thereof. Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom had their government and workers' rep-
resentatives vote in favor of the Convention, while their
employers' representative abstained. Of all the ten members
of the EEC, not one of them had any representative vote
against the Convention. This immediately sets these
countries apart from the United States, which had only its
workers' representative vote in favor of the Convention. How
have these EEC countries implemented the standards advocated
by the ILO?
1. The United Kingdom
a. The Common Law
At British Common Law, the employee is an at will
employee, but is entitled to "reasonable notice" before
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evitable solution to this.
In 1965, the Donovan Commission on Trade Unions and
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There were very few avenues for alleviating, t' 2ternuna l.on.
While the ruling Conservatives and the opposition Labor
In 1964, the British government had announced that it had
Britain began seriously to seek ways to implement ILO Recom-
mendation 119.5 An unfair dismissal statute was the in-
als, strikes which seriously affected the productivity and
profitability of many businesses.4 At the same time, Great
were numerous wildcat strikes in response to unfair dismiss-
During the 1960's, there were two major impetus calling
this problem since tort law could not be expanded to accom-
modate the problem and contract law remedies were sparse.3
for an end to the common law rule. In that decade, there
b. Legislative Activity Begins
accepted and would conform to Recommendation 119. A Com-
mittee of the Minister of Labour's National Joint Advisory
few personnel policies governing dismissal and its procedures
Council issued a report on the matter in 1967 and noted very
in the unorganized sector and varying effectiveness of such
procedures in the organized sector.
terms of reference involving labor-management matters in
Employer's Associations, a separate commission with broad
agreed on the need for statutory protection against unfair
general, specifically called for unfair dismissal legisla-
t' 6l.on.
Party disagreed extensively on most issues, both parties
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dismissal. This was finally achieved with the enactment of
the 1971 Industrial Relations Act,7 later the 1978 Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act,8 as amended in 1980.9
c. The Statutory Guarantee
Section 22 of the original Industrial Relations Act
declared: "In every employment to which this section ap-
plied, every employee shall have the right not to be unfairly
dismissed by his employer." After making this general
guarantee, the statute proceeds to specify valid reasons for
discharge. These are set out in Section 57(2) of the EPCA
and include:
i. A reason related to the capability or qualifications
of the employee for performing work of the kind which
one was employed by employer to do.
ii. A reason related to the conduct of the employee.
iii. That the employee was redundant.
iv. That the employee could not continue to work in the
position which he held without contravention (either
on his part or that of his employer) of a duty or
restriction imposed by or under enactment.
v. Some other substantial reason of a kind such as to
justify the dismissal of an employee holding the
position that employee held.10
d. Coverage
While coverage is fairly broad, there are a number of
qualified and absolute exceptions. Generally protection is
granted to those who have been continuously employed for six
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months in jobs with twenty or more employees. In firms with
less than twenty employees, the employees must first have
worked for two years before protection is extended to them,
unless dismissal was a result of a workers trade union ac-
tivities or was on certain medical grounds. Workers with
fixed term contracts of one year or more, who have agreed to
waive their protection rights, are also excluded.ll However,
refusal to renew a contract can be cause for complaint.
Workers employed by their spouses are not protected, nor are
those over the normal retirement age. There is no distinc-
tion between public and private sector workers, nor between
, , d d .. d 1 12un10n1ze an non-un10n1ze emp oyees.
While the latter may be true, and while employer and
employee cannot generally contract out of the above protec-
tion, employers can substitute "dismissal procedures
agreements" for statutory coverage if certain requirements
are met. Under Section 65, the parties (the employer and the
union) can jointly apply for a substitution order. There are
two essentials which must be met before such a request can be
considered. Firstly, remedies must be "as beneficial" as
those provided for by statute13 and secondly, there must be a
"f t l' t' 1 d .. k' 14 I fprov1s1on or even ua 1mpar 1a eC1S1on-ma 1ng. n act,
very few substitution orders are sought.1S
e. Enforcement Procedures
The procedure for enforcement of one's protective rights
is straightforward. Complaint forms must be filed within
three months at the local offices of the Department of
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16Employment. After the filing, an independent government
body, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Services
(ACAS) attempts conciliation by meeting with both the com-
plainant and the employer (about sixty percent of the cases
are disposed of at this stage).17 If conciliation attempts
fail, the case goes before the Industrial Tribunal. The In-
dustrial Tribunal is a tripartite arbitration panel compris-
ing a barrister or solicitor of at least seven years standing
acting as chairman, a person from an employers' association
and one from a union or workers' association. The two
wingmen are not meant to serve as proponents of one par-
ticular standpoint, but rather as experienced laymen.18
Lawyers are not typical, hearings are short and there are
generally no post-hearing briefs.
Appeals on points of law lie in the Employment Appeals
Tribunal. This is also a tripartite body, but has a high
court judge acting as Chairman (approximately four percent of
trial level hearings are appealed to this level).19 There is
theoretically an appeal from here to the Court of Appeals and
then to the House of Lords. However, these would be con-
sidered most unusual.
f. Burden
The burden in these cases is essentially upon the
employer in that he must come forward and present reasons to
validate the discharge.
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g. Remedies
The remedies entail either restatement, which is not com-
mon, or damages. The damages typically have two components;
first, a "basic" award, which is computed by means of a
statutory formula taking into account a number of work re-
lated factors. Second, a "compensatory" award under Section
74 which is "such amount as the tribunal considers just and
equitable in all circumstances." The award is designed to
cover expenses, etc. and sometimes emotional distress.
It is evident that Great Britain has come a long way in
complying with ILO standards. Problems do still exist,
however. Anderman20 has suggested that the pattern of inter-
pretation of the statute by the various adjudicating bodies
indicates that too much room has been left for discretion.
while Section 57 states that the tribunal must decide whether
the employer's decision to terminate was "reasonable" in the
circumstances and in accordance with equity and the substan-
tive merit of the case, the Court of Appeals has held
generally that good faith belief by the employer is suffi-
cient.21 It claims that this is too lax a standard. It also
cites the problem of too broad exclusions from coverage. 22
While some see a number of problems inherent in the
statute, others point to the great changes in personnel prac-
tices that have occurred.23 On the heels of legislative
enactment, many companies reviewed their procedures on dis-
cipline and discharge. The result was that employers became
better informed, and hiring and training procedures were
-----------------------, 1~
75
refined. It is perhaps this educative effect every bit as
much as the substance of the Act which has helped improve job
security in Britain.
2. West Germany
In Germany, "just cause" for dismissal in some form or
other has been required since 1920.24 Today, there are basi-
cally three statutes which are relevant to the issue of
unfair dismissal in that country, namely the Civil Code, the
Act on Protection Against Unfair Dismissals, and the Works
Council Act.
a. Civil Code
Section 626 of the Civil Code makes dismissal without
legal notice only "if there are reasons which in view of all
the circumstances of the case and in evaluating the interests
of the two parties make in intolerable for one of the parties
to fulfill the contract until the end of the period of
notice." This Section applies to all labor contracts.
b. Act on Protection Against Unfair Dismissals
The major source of job protection legislation is the Act
on Protection Against Unfair Dismissals. This Act
i. Guarantee
Section 1 of the Act outlaws "socially unjustified"
dismissals and defines them as those dismissals "not based on
reasons connected with the person or conduct of the employee
or an urgent operating requirement precluding his continued
employment in the establishment.25 It should be remembered
that misconduct is a reason for summary dismissal under the
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Civil Code. The misconduct referred to here is of lesser
gravity and does not result in summary discharge, but ter-
mination after a certain notice period.
ii. Coverage
To be covered by this Act, the worker must have been
working for the particular enterprise for at least six
months. Furthermore, if a plant has five or fewer employees,
there is no coverage. All that is provided these workers is
the customary notice period. The higher level the employee,
the less protection is accorded him or her against unfair
dismissal.
iii. Enforcement
After an alleged unfair dismissal, the employee has
three weeks to file a declaratory action in a local labor
court challenging such dismissal. Before the case comes to a
hearing, a conciliation session must be held. This is con-
ducted by the professional judge who will chair the hearing
if it comes to that. Between thirty and forty percent of all
cases are settled at this stage.26
iv. Hearing
The dispute settlement bodies in dismissal cases are ex-
clusively the Labor Courts. The lower level labor court is,
as in Great Britain, a tripartite body comprised by the
professional judge and two lay judges, respectively repre-
senting the employee and employer. The lay judges are ap-
pointed for a limited time and usually have other occupa-
tions, while the professional judge is legally trained and
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appointed for life. An appeal from this level lies in the
Labor Court of Appeals and then ultimately to the Federal
Labor Court in Kassel. Appeals are on points of law only.27
v. Remedies
Remedies are not usually reinstatement, but more commonly
compensation computed under a legislative formula. Where
reinstatement is not feasible, the general rule is that a sum
not exceeding twelve months' earnings are awarded by way of
compensation. There are variations of the formula, depending
on age and duration of employment.28
c. Works Council Act
The Works Council Act is an important part of the unfair
dismissal machinery. Works councils are generally in exist-
ence in all firms where there are more than five employees.
There should be a proportionate representation of both sexes
and of wage and salary earners on the council.
The works council must be notified in writing of any
proposed dismissal with notice, and the reasons for the dis-
missal. This should take place before the employee has been
notified of the impending dismissal and discharged -- other-
wise, the dismissal is illegal, irrespective of the reasons
for it. The council, after considering the matter, can under
Section 102(1) respond to the dismissal and may formally
challenge the dismissal within seven days if it so wishes.
It should convey its opinion to the employer in writing. If
management refuses to concede to the challenge, the council
may invoke review by a conciliation committee comprising an
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equal number of council and management representatives. The
committee then makes a final decision on the matter.
If the employee is dismissed over the council's objec-
tions, the employer must give the employee a copy of the
council's statement for the employee's use in the labor
courts, to which he still has direct access. However, when
dismissal is over the council's objections, the employer must
continue to employ the "terminated" worker until the labor
court decision is final (an employer can be relieved of this
duty by seeking an injunction in certain circums~ances) .
If the works council concurs in the employer's decision to
terminate, all the employer need do is send official notice
of the dismissal to the employee. The terminated worker
still has access to the labor courts, but his chances of
success in these circumstances are slim.
Where there is a dismissal without notice, i.e., a summary
dismissal, the council must still be notified and now has
three days to respond. The council's objection to a summary
dismissal has the same effect as dismissals with notice.
However, the employer is required to act no later than two
weeks after becoming aware of the alleged misconduct.
The existence of the works council and their role as
reviewers of employer action in dismissal matters serves as
an incentive for employers to seriously consider the validity
of their reasons before terminating a worker. While the
councils cannot prevent dismissals, an employer is usually
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anxious to secure their cooperation, for they do play other
roles in the labor-management area.
This form of employee protection, as well as that provided
by the two aforementioned acts, allow scholars to claim
without exaggeration that "arbitrary dismissals are almost
impossible. "29 This is not to say that the situation in the
Federal Republic is ideal, for there are many shortcomings,
most noticeable of which. is the almost complete absence of
reinstatement as a remedy. West Germany has nevertheless
come a long way towards complying with ILO standards.
3. France
In France, "the employee has a right to unilaterally dis-
miss an individual contract of employment at any time, but he
may do so lawfully only for a genuine and serious cause and
by following a specific procedure.30
Dismissal for cause is regulated by Section 122-14 of the
Labor Code and by precedent set by various court decisions
interpreting the Code. While the dismissal must be for
"genuine and serious" cause, the act does not define the term
precisely and it has been left to the courts to decide what
it means. It seems that no strict rules are applied and each
case is tried on its own merits. "Genuine and serious" cause
has been held to include factors such as incompetence, loss
of physical ability to perform the work, corporate restruc-
ture, etc.
Coverage for most provisions is for those workers with two
years' seniority in firms of ten or more employees. There is
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coverage for various groups of less senior employees,
however.
Even if there is real and serious cause, the proper proce-
dure must be followed by the employer. Firstly, the employee
about to be dismissed must be summoned to a hearing with the
employer, during which the latter must inform the worker of
the grounds of the dismissal. The idea is to allow for pos-
sible reconciliation at this stage.
If the employer persists with his intention to terminate,
he must then notify the employee in writing of the real and
serious grounds for dismissal if so requested. This is used
by the employee if he wishes to take the matter further.
The employee would take his case to the labor court, com-
petent to resolve all disputes between employer and employee
regarding individual contracts of employment. The courts are
composed of lay judges exclusively, equally split between the
employer and labor sides. At the appellate level these
courts branch out into the regular civil court system where
professional judges sit. Access to the courts is easy and
free.
If the courts find that the dismissal was for "genuine and
serious" cause, it is held to be unlawful but not void. The
court can therefore only recommend reinstatement. If
reinstatement is refused, the court awards the employee com-
pensation not less than the amount of six months wages,
regardless of how soon he finds another job. Compensation
can exceed six months pay depending on the extent of the
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individual components that go up to make the damages, such as
compensation in lieu of notice, severance pay, etc.
If the court finds that the employee was dismissed for
real and serious cause, he must be continued in employment
during the notice period or paid wages in lieu thereof. He
is also entitled to severance pay and compensation for ac-
crued severance leave. A worker dismissed for what the court
considers a "grave" offense, can collect only compensation
for leave not taken. An employee fired for what the court
considers a "heavy" offense receives no compensation of any
kind.
4. Canada
Despite its geographical proximity to the United States,
the Canadian law on unfair dismissal has far more in common
with the Western European countries than with its North
American counterpart.
Protection of unorganized workers was instituted by means
of a Federal statute inserted into the Canadian Labour Code
as Section 61.5.31 Legislation at the federal level spawned
an immediate problem in that the laws extend only to the work
force which is regulated by federal laws, in effect only
about 10% of the Canadian work force.32
The statute requires all employers covered by the legisla-
tion to show "cause" before dismissing the employee. The
guarantee is not defined by the statute and it has been left
to the adjudicators to define the extent of the protection
encompassed thereby.
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The scope of the protection extends only to dismissals
themselves and not to issues such as discipline, hiring, etc.
Those covered by the statute are workers within the federal
jurisdiction who have been continuously employed in that en-
terprise for twelve months. People such as independent con-
tractors are not covered, nor are high level employees such
as managers and executives. The statute further provides
that workers otherwise covered will have protection unless a
"procedure for redress has been provided elsewhere in or un-
der this or any other Act of Parliament."32 This provision
excludes workers covered by collective bargaining agreements
with eventual recourse to an independent hearing.
If a worker feels that he has been unfairly dismissed, he
must file a complaint with the Ministry of Labour within
thirty days. Once the complaint has been received, there are
two steps that have to be followed. Firstly, a conciliation
hearing is held under the auspices of the Minister. At this
stage, the employer is required to give written reasons for
the dismissal so that the problem can be properly addressed.
If no conciliation is achieved at this stage, the Minister
may appoint anyone he considers suitable as an adjudicator to
chair an inquiry into the justness of the dismissal.
If the adjudicator finds that there was no just cause for
the dismissal, or even that there was such cause but it is
established that no form of progressive discipline was in-
volved, there are a number of remedies available. The ad-
judicator is entitled to order reinstatement and compensation
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not exceeding that remuneration that would have been paid had
the worker not been dismissed. The adjudicators award and
the decision is largely insulated from judicial review and
may be filed in the Federal Court of Canada in order to af-
ford to it the same effect as a judgment of that court.
Civil remedies which may be available are not destroyed by
the statutory protection.34
B. General Characteristics of These Countries' Dismissal
Law
The differences between the United States and the other
countries that have been considered are very obvious. Ob-
servers disagree as to what they consider the most striking
differences to be.35 Nevertheless, there are a number of
very significant characteristics of unfair dismissal law com-
mon to all the countries that have been considered other than
the United States.
Perhaps one of the most significant characteristics of
these countries is the impact supra-national bodies such as
the EEC and the ILO have had on domestic legislation. It has
already been observed what little effect, if any, the various
ILO measures have had on the United States. In contrast, the
ILO, particularly as far as the Western European countries
are concerned, has been a very significant influence on the
implementation of unfair dismissal laws in these countries.
Bellace refers to a greater readiness in these countries to
regard a job as the "property" of the employee.36
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One obvious characteristic of these countries is the ab-
sence of the at will doctrine and the statutory regulation of
unfair dismissal matters. Discharged employees very rarely
have to resort to common law resolution of alleged wrongful
dismissals.
Most of these countries guarantee protection against
unfair dismissal statutorily. While a number of these
countries, such as Britain, make some attempt to define what
is meant by unfair dismissal, most countries provide for a
vague prohibition and allow the courts or tribunals to deter-
mine the full extent of the protection afforded by the
statute. This leaves room for development of the law
to meet changing demands and avoids the problem of loop-holes
being made available to employers.
There is generally some limitation on the extent of
coverage provided to employees. There is usually provision
for a probationary period which ranges from six months in
Britain to up to two years in certain instances in France.
Very small firms are commonly exempted, as are managerial
employees. Workers covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments are excluded in countries such as Canada where the
union offers protection as one of its major functions and of
a quality probably better than the statute. In Germany and
Britain where unions are not very extensively involved in in-
dividual job protection specifically, the organized workers
are drawn under the auspices of the general Act just like
anyone else.
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If a covered worker feels that he has been unfairly dis-
missed, there is uniformly provision for eventual referral of
the matter to a special tribunal designed to deal with these
issues. These tribunals however, are only drawn into the
process after some form of conciliation has been attempted.
It is a characteristic of these countries that an attempt is
made to resolve the matter before there is need for a binding
decision one way or the other. Many cases (up to 40% in
Britain) are resolved at this stage, lessening the burden
imposed on the eventual neutral tribunal.
The tribunals themselves are generally composed of one
professional presiding officer and a number of lay judges who
are intended to bring some sort of expertise into the field.
While this is true of Britain and Germany, in Canada and
France the first level hearing is entirely in the hands of
lay people who have extensive experience in these matters.
At the hearing itself, the burden is generally lifted from
the employee and evenly distributed, if not placed on the
shoulders of the employer. The employer is generally called
upon to present evidence of the just cause for the dismissal.
Usually he must not only show just cause, but must also prove
that he followed the necessary procedure when terminating the
employer. Bellace sees the essential nature of this proce-
dure as the "most striking difference" between the United
States and the other countries that have been considered. It
is felt that in these latter countries a rigid procedure when
effectuating a dismissal will diminish arbitrary termination
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and that it acts as a series of checks against unreasoned
discharge.
Perhaps a defect of many of these states' unfair dismissal
laws is the ineffectiveness of the reinstatement remedy. In
France, reinstatement cannot be legally ordered, and even
when it can, it is seldom done. Statutory formulae for com-
pensation are meant to satisfy the claims of the workers who
are not reinstated and are often used in a punitive manner.
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CHAPTER VI
UNFAIR DISMISSAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
A worthwhile insight into unfair dismissal law in South
Africa is impossible without a thorough consideration of a
broader legal framework of which this concept is a part.
South Africa's very dynamic socio-economic climate is
reflected in the rapidly changing labor relations law which
is in evidence at this moment.
Industrial relations in South Africa are regulated
primarily by the Labour Relations Act of 1956. The Act has
been amended on numerous occasions, but none have been more
significant than the series of amendments which were in-
stituted after the Wiehahn Commission tabled Part I of its
report in Parliament on May 1, 1979.1 The Commission was es-
tablished on June 21, 1977, under the chairmanship of Profes-
sor N. E. Wiehahn. The lack of skilled manpower, the in-
creasing demands of the black labor force and ever-expanding
black trade unionism,2 coupled with a series of massive work
stoppages in the port city of Durban in 1973 and 1974,3
played a significant role in motivating its establishment.
The Commission was given wide terms of reference to inquire
into and to make recommendations in connection with all ex-
isting legislation dealing with labor matters in the country.
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The series of post-1979 amendments became known as the
"new labour dispensation"4 and introduced revolutionary
changes in industrial practice and relations law.
Prior to 1979 only an "employee" as defined by the Act had
access to the machinery of the statute and to its collective
bargaining processes. Black workers, regulated by the
separate Black Labour Relations Regulations Act 48 of 1953,
did not fall within this definition. However, in 1979 cer-
tain black workers were included and the process was con-
cluded in 1981 when this definition was further extended to
include all workers irrespective of race.5 As a result of
this amendment, the Act which the legislature had been "at
pains to free of all racial connotation,"6 race was no longer
an all-important disqualifier from access to the statutory
machinery. In addition, the Act abolished job reservation
for whites; established a National Manpower Commission com-
prising representatives from the state, employers and
employees; constituted a new Industrial Court with sig-
nificant novel duties and powers; and introduced to South
African labor relations law the concept of "unfair labour
practices.,,7
A. The General Structure of the Act
Since the 1956 Labour Relations Act is a long and complex
document, there will be no attempt to analyze it in its en-
tirety. An examination of various parts of the Act which
will be relevant to dispute resolution, more particularly
that involving unfair dismissal, will however be undertaken.
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The Act makes provision for the office of the industrial
registrar8 whose duty it is inter alia to oversee the
registration of trade unions and employer organizations who
desire to be so registered. Registration is not a prerequi-
site to valid and legal existence of these bodies, but it is
essential if the organization is to receive a number of im-
portant benefits. A union is registered if it is considered
sufficiently represented in an industry and area in which it
desires to operate.9 General unions not confining their mem-
bership ~o a particular industry are not registrable.10
1. Industrial Councils
Upon registration the trade union or employers' organiza-
tion can partake in the formation of the important industrial
councils. Industrial councils are permanent bodies formed by
the association of one or more registered trade unions and
one or more registered employer organizations. They are
formed to operate in a particular location and in a par-
ticular industry.ll The councils themselves have to be
registered to obtain jurisdiction in their particular area
and location.12 The purpose of these industrial councils is
"to take such steps as it may think expedient to bring about
the regulation or settlement of matters of mutual inter-
est.,,13 In other words, the function of the industrial coun-
cil is to negotiate over matters such as terms and conditions
of employment, wages, etc., much in the same way as the trade
unions in the United States. More importantly, it is the
task of the industrial council "within the undertaking, trade
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or occupation and in the area, in respect of which it has
been registered, (to) endeavor by the negotiation of agree-
ments or otherwise to prevent disputes from arising, and to
settle disputes that have arisen or may arise."14 These
objectives are achieved primarily by the negotiation of in-
dustrial council agreements. These agreements are applicable
to the registered trade unions and employer organizations
party to the particular industrial council involved in the
negotiation thereof.
The agreement negotiated by the parties only gains legal
effect once the Minister has declared it binding in the
Government Gazette.IS Furthermore, the Minister may extend
some or all provisions of the agreement onto "non-parties" to
the industrial council who work in an industry and location
within that council's jurisdiction. The Minister also has
the power within limitations to declare an industrial council
agreement binding on employers and workers in a related in-
dustry to that served by the council, but outside the actual
jurisdiction of the latter.16 The purpose of these extensions
is to insure uniformity of service conditions and to prevent
undercutting of wages by non-parties.
2. Conciliation Boards
There are many instances where, despite the existence of
registered trade unions and employer organizations in a par-
ticular location and industry, no industrial council agree-
ment exists.IS This can be the result of weak unions or the
development of alternative methods for conducting
labor-management affairs than is provided by the Act. The
rupt labor-management relations, where there is no body to
trade unions and employees on the one hand, and one or more
--
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A conciliation board is a temporary body
To accommodate situations such as these, the Act provides
non-existence of an industrial council can be problematic if
a dispute of whatever nature arises that can seriously dis-
which the matter may be referred for resolution.
for the establishment of conciliation boards on application
h " 19to t e M~n~ster.
established on an "ad hoc" basis for the purpose of settling
disputes which may already have arisen. The membership of
the conciliation board is open to a far wider list of parties
than is the case with an industrial council. The statute
stipulates that whenever a dispute arises between one or more
employer organizations or employers on the other, any such
A very important aspect of the machinery for our
party may apply for the establishment of the conciliation
20board.
purposes is the availability of the conciliation process to
unregistered organizations and to individuals with no union
representation. For many years, only registered organiza-
tions could apply for the establishment of these boards, but
in what Swanepoel calls a "cardinal departure from the pre-
vious philosophy of the Act,"21 which sought to exclude un-
registered trade unions from many benefits of the Act, the
situation was changed by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 2
of 1983.
22
It would appear that the motive for this
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innovation was the attempt to ease tensions with major black
trade unions that refused to register for some reason or
other and to bring them into the "more sociable atmosphere"
of the Act.23
Individuals themselves cannot generally apply for the
establishment of conciliation boards. The applicant must
either be a registered trade union or a trade union that has
complied with Section 35(14) (b). Compliance with this Sec-
tion demands the submission by unregistered trade unions to
the registrar of a copy of their constitution, as well as a
list of names of their office bearers.24 It is also required
that there be a maintenance of a register of members, showing
their names, their fees paid and the periods to which these
25payments relate. The Section also requires that the un-
registered union keep proper books of account and have its
headquarters within the Republic of South Africa.26 This
trade union must also show that the individual on whose be-
half it is applying was at all material times a member in
good standing, and that the union is sufficiently repre-
sentative of the applicant's fellow workers from the same
class of workers as he, and that the individual gave
authorization to the union.27
One occasion when an individual can make application on
his own behalf is where the dispute involves an alleged
unfair labor practice.28 The importance of this exception
for our purposes will become apparent later.
·.,
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The Minister has a fairly wide discretion in deciding
29whether or not to accede to the request. He may do so "if
he deems it expedient.,,30 There have until now been no in-
dications of abuse of this discretion and the avenue to dis-
pute resolution via the conciliation board system has pro-
vided a wide range of workers with a potential means of
relief. Alleged unfairly dismissed workers have this above
mentioned channel available to them.
3. Industrial Court Determination Under Section 46(9)
If a dispute has been referred to an industrial council
and not settled within thirty days or a conciliation board
has been approved and it has not resolved the issue in thirty
days, the dispute must be referred to the industrial court
for determination.31 However, the dispute is only referred
for final determination if it involves an alleged unfair
1 b . 32a or practl.ce.
Resolution of alleged unfair practices is one of the
statutorily prescribed functions of the Industrial Court and
probably its primary function. The term "unfair labour
practice" is defined in Section 1.33 However, it is defined
in extraordinarily broad terms and it is basically up to the
court to decide the content and boundaries of the concept.
Determinations of what labor practices are "unfair" and which
are not, has become one of the most sensitive areas of the
"new dispensation" and is of significance when specifically
looking at the position of the unfairly dismissed worker.
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4. "Status Quo" Orders
One final institution should be mentioned. Section 43 of
the Act makes provision for the granting of "status quo"
orders by the Industrial Court. It often happens that once a
dispute has arisen, a delay is experienced by the employee or
employees before the case is resolved by the industrial coun-
cil, conciliation board, or the Industrial Court itself under
Section 46(9). To alleviate potential hardship to the
employee during these times, the Act provides for the In-
dustrial Court to make interim orders.
Provided the dispute relates either to a termination or
suspension of labor,34 a change in the conditions of employ-
35ment, or to an alleged unfair labor practice and provided
the party aggrieved has referred the matter to an industrial
councilor made application for the establishment of a con-
'I' , b d 37 h k t t dC1 1at1on oar, t at party may see a s a us quo or er
freezing the position as it existed prior to the dispute.
The Industrial Court determines the validity of the applica-
tion for relief by applying the same criteria thereto as
regular courts do when assessing requests for interlocutory
interdicts. 38
B. Recognition Agreements
Not all trade unions and employer organizations wish to
make use of the collective bargaining offered by the Act.
Indeed, in such major industries as gold and coal mining, the
employers and trade unions have, for various reasons, found
it unnecessary or undesirable to form industrial councils for
~,
\
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their industries. Many black trade unions, suspicious of
government motives in making the machinery of the Act avail-
able to them, have chosen not to register, and thus are
automatically excluded from participation in industrial coun-
cils.
Despite their reluctance to participate in the statutory
structure, a new type of collective bargaining outside of
this known as "the recognition agreements system" has arisen.
These recognition agreements are usually the sole property of
the stronger unions and have the same legal effect as common
law contracts.39 These agreements contain official recogni-
tion of the particular trade union involved and often include
terms on working conditions and wages as well as a dispute
resolution procedure. Experience has shown that it is the
foreign businesses in South Africa that are most likely to
enter into these types of agreements with the black unions.40
For workers in establishments covered by these recognition
agreements, protection against unfair dismissal is regulated
by the contents of each particular agreement, with the best
of these including an eventual resort to an independent
decision-maker.
It should be noted that registered unions too may form
recognition agreements, distinct from their industrial coun-
cil duties. This is done primarily to achieve a measure of
in-plant agreement as opposed to the broad and general terms
of an industrial council agreement.
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C. The Unfairly Dismissed Worker in South Africa
As the Labour Relations Act stands at the time of this
writing, there is no specific mention of the concept of un-
fair dismissal at all.4l In South Africa there has been a
tendency to allege that an unfair dismissal constitutes an
unfair labor practice. It will be remembered that one of the
functions of the Industrial Court is to make determinations
on alleged unfair labor practices after the industrial coun-
cil or conciliation board has failed to settle the matter.
Thus, by equating the concepts of an unfair labor practice
and unfair dismissal, the court has effectively given relief
to workers who were previously parties to at will employment
contracts.
The extension of unfair labor practices to include cases
of unfair dismissal is not in any way to be considered an un-
authorized or unjustified one; indeed, the Wiehahn Commission
itself recommended that the Industrial Court should inter
alia investigate and hear cases of alleged unfair dismiss-
als.42
It is proposed in the paragraphs that follow to consider
various factors relevant to unfair dismissal, such as the
nature of the guarantee, scope and coverage, methods of en-
forcement, the hearings and the remedies available in the
South African context. By so doing, an evaluation can be
made of the intrinsic and comparative worth of the present
system.
99
It should be mentioned at this stage that although South
Africa withdrew from the ILO in 1964, the Wiehahn Commission
strongly recommended that South Africa make every effort to
bring its labor legislation in line to the fullest extent
possible with international labor Conventions, Recommenda-
tions, and other international instruments.43 The Commission
further suggested that South Africa begin once again the
practice of submitting reports to the ILO in regard to Con-
ventions that it had ratified. The Commission also wanted to
explore ways in which South Africa could improve contact with
international labor generally.
1. The Guarantee
Workers who are covered by some collective bargaining
agreement such as an industrial council agreement or a recog-
nition agreement often have a dismissal standard and proce-
dure in the particular agreement by which they are governed.
These can vary depending on the nature of the agreement.
However, even if a worker has applied to the industrial coun-
cil for relief and no help has been forthcoming, he can even-
tually have the matter determined by the Industrial Court un-
der Section 46(9) if he alleges his dismissal amounted to an
unfair labor practice.
As mentioned earlier, there is no specific outlawing of
unfair dismissal but rather an equating of the latter with an
unfair labor practice and the offering of relief on that
basis. "Fairness in this context has nothing to do with
legality, but relates to the way the dismissal takes place,
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the reasons for it and the effect that it has on the employee
and the state of industrial relations within the company.
The definition of unfair labor practices is alarmingly wide,
and the allegation that by unfairly dismissing an employee an
employer commits an unfair labor practice has established the
concept of unfair dismissal in South Africa.n44
In the number of cases presented to the Industrial Court
thus far, the Court has usually considered the following
aspects:
i. Do the facts on which the employer relies to
justify the dismissal actually exist?
ii. Even if the facts have been established, did the
employee's action justify dismissal?
iii. Was the dismissal carried out in a fair manner and
was a fair procedure followed? Generally this requirement
demands that a worker had been given a hearing before his
dismissal where the details of his proposed dismissal are
put before him.45
Dismissals in contravention of industrial council are
automatically unfair labor practices and there need be no
regard to objective standards of fairness as espoused by the
court. 46
While the Labour Relations Act does not define unfair dis-
missal, unlike the statutes in many other countries we have
considered, the Industrial Court, by means of the unfair
labor practice procedure, has produced a guarantee against
unfair dismissal largely in keeping with Article 4 of the
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1982 Convention. The Industrial Court has generally found
reasons for dismissal bearing no relation to the "capacity of
the worker" or the "operational requirements of the
undertaking"47 to be unfair labor practices.48 In fact, the
Court has shown the compatibility of its decisions with Ar-
ticle 5 of the Convention by not only terminations based on
race remediable, but even by declaring racial slurs to be un-
f· 1 b . 49a~r a or pract~ces.
The vagueness of the guarantee as offered in the
context of an unfair labor practice may be an object of
criticism. However, while there are admittedly some
countries such as the German Democratic Republic and the
U.S.S.R. which define the concept a valid reason for dis-
missal in detailed terms,50 there are many countries where
legislation is phrased in very general terms. France, for
example, requires only a "genuine and serious" cause for a
valid dismissal.51 The Canadian Unfair Dismissal Statute
similarly requires only "cause" and leaves it up to the
adjudicators to give content to the concept.52
In South Africa the court has on occasion referred to
various ILO Conventions and Recommendations in termination
cases53 and found the lack of definition no real obstacle.
In fact, at the time of this writing, there is a draft bill
before the House of Parliament in South Africa further amend-
ing the Labour Relations Act as it now stands.54 This draft
bill, which will be more fully examined later, would make
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specific reference to unfair dismissal and give rather
detailed definition thereof.
2. Scope
The concept of unfair labor practice and the vague
statutory definition thereof, allows an applicant to claim
that discipline short of discharge amounts to an unfair labor
practice and consequently seek relief therefrom.
In many countries, unfair dismissal statutes are limited
to just that, namely dismissal.55 Often a worker would ex-
perience a disciplinary measure which would be as devastating
as dismissal, but have no potential relief available. In
South Africa, as long as the worker could convince the In-
dustrial Court that a unfair labor practice had been com-
mitted, relief would be forthcoming.
3. Coverage
One of the major criticisms leveled against the South
African law as it pertains to unfair dismissal is the issue
of limited coverage. The Act applies to "every undertaking,
industry, trade, or occupation."56 There are no exclusions
of businesses with limited workforces or which have been in
existence for a limited period. There are, however, a number
of workers who are absolutely disqualified from coverage by
the Act. The statute does not apply to persons in respect of
h . I 'f' ,57 d t't e1r emp oyment 1n arm1ng operat10ns nor to omes 1C
service in private households.58 State employees are also
excluded as are voluntary workers in charitable institutions.
People who are working in an undertaking as a means of
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completing their education or university training are
similarlyexcluded.59
Participation in industrial council agreements is open
only to registered trade unions and hence, only members
thereof are afforded the particular protection such an agree-
ment may provide against unfair dismissal. The Minister does
have the power to order an extension of some or all of the
provisions to "non-parties," which may result in employees
who are not members of registered unions being covered by the
agreement.60 It will be remembered that referral of a dispute
to an industrial council is one of the two essential alterna-
tives before a party can forward an alleged unfair labor
practice to the Industrial Court for final determination un-
der Section 46(9).
Cassim cites the fact that industrial council agreements
regulating unfair dismissal do not apply to the many workers
outside their scope and sees this as one of the primary
reasons for the need for the implantation of an unfair dis-
missal statute.61
However, while it is to be admitted that a wide range of
workers are excluded for various reasons from coverage by an
industrial council agreement and hence a potential avenue by
means of which an alleged unfair dismissal could corne before
the court, the conciliation board system goes a long way
towards redressing this problem. As alluded to earlier, for
a trade union to apply for a conciliation board on behalf of
a member, it need not be registered. It need only comply
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with Section 35(14) (b). Furthermore, if the dispute to be
referred to the conciliation board involves an alleged unfair
labor practice, the individual may apply on his own behalf,
whether he is a member of a registered trade union or not.
Coverage therefore is very extensive, and reaches out to
workers in every "undertaking, industry, trade or occupation"
who are not, by definition, excluded from the confines of the
Act.
The wide range of occupations and industries to which the
Act applies is in keeping with Article 2 of the 1982 Conven-
tion which requires that coverage extend to "all branches of
economic activity." The Act does not exclude small firms
from coverage, nor is there a specific length of time for
which an employee must be employed before coverage extends to
him. High level managerial employees are similarly not ex-
cluded from coverage. While a number of categories of
workers are excluded contrary to the spirit of Article 2 of
the Convention, the South African statute shows up better in
the area of coverage than most of the countries that have
been considered in this work.
It has been seen how, in Great Britain, a worker must
necessarily have been continuously employed for six months in
an establishment with twenty or more employees before
coverage is extended to him;62 in smaller firms the worker
must have been employed for a minimum of two years. Workers
under fixed term contracts are similarly excluded. West
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Germany, France and Canada too have fairly stringent limita-
tions on coverage.
This is not to say that coverage in South Africa is per-
fectly satisfactory. Many workers, while theoretically
covered by the Act, simply lack the know-how to use the
relief potentially available to them. The machinery of the
Act is still very complex and shrouded in procedural
obstacles. Often access to specialized legal counselor a
highly organized trade union is the only practical mode of
implementing one's rights. With the large and often indigent
black labor force in South Africa, this is obviously not
always a viable alternative.
It is submitted that the establishment of a body similar
in concept to the EEOC should be instituted. This body could
process requests from unfairly dismissed workers for assis-
tance and make application to the Minister on their behalf
for the establishment of conciliation boards to whom the mat-
ter could be referred at the first level. The body would not
usurp the role of the trade unions in this area, but merely
act where the trade unions lack the means under Section
35(14) (b) to apply on behalf of an individual or where the
individual may apply on his own behalf.
Another possible limitation on coverage is the virtually
unfettered discretion of the Minister in deciding whether or
not to grant a request for the establishment of a concilia-
t1.·onboard or not.63 H b'l t t d t t th t fis a 1.i y 0 ic a e e erms 0
reference of these bodies once constituted is also possibly
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limiting and may exclude the worker from having recourse to
the Industrial Court by means of the unfair labor practice
procedure. 64 This problem could be eliminated by setting out
in the Act the objective jurisdictional facts that need to
exist before the Minister MUST accede to the request and by
allowing the board itself to decide the issue before it.
4. Enforcement
The enforcement procedure for the resolution of an unfair
dismissal in the guise of an unfair labor practice, has al-
ready been examined. Recourse must be had to the relevant
industrial council, if one exists, or it must be sought by
means of the establishment of a conciliation board. If these
bodies are unable to settle the issue, the unfair dismissal,
if it is alleged to be an unfair labor practice, is referred
to the Industrial Court for final determination under Section
46 (9) •
Probably the major weakness inherent in the enforcement
procedure is the previously mentioned lack of an administra-
tive body that can be approached to aid the unfairly dis-
missed worker in processing his grievance through the
statutory machinery. In the United States, where there are
specific protections against certain types of unfair dismiss-
als, there is the EEOC which processes grievances; in
Britain, the local offices of the Department of Employment
have jurisdiction over such agreements. These administrative
bodies, which handle the grievances before they finally corne
to court, play an important role in assisting workers who
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lack the know-how to process a claim right through the
bureaucratic entanglements which often are present.
The 1982 ILO Convention makes no reference to these types
of bodies. Article 15 of the 1982 Recommendation provides
that "[e]fforts should be made by public authorities •••to en-
sure that workers are fully informed of the possibilities of
appeal at their disposal.,,65 It is submitted that there can
be no true compliance with this Article unless there exists a
body to whom workers can refer to help process their
grievance when there is no trade union which can perform the
same function on their behalf.
5. Hearing
The eventual forum for deciding an unfair dismissal when
equated with an unfair labor practice is the Industrial
Court. This body consists of a president, a deputy presi-
dent, and any number of other members the Minister may deter-
mine. The officials are appointed "by reason of their
knowledge of the law." Due to the dramatic increase in the
use of the Court, the Minister has used his Section 17(6A) (i)
power to appoint temporary ad hoc members who hear specific
cases. These members are usually practicing lawyers or
academics. Generally, cases are heard by one member.
Rarely, two members may hear a case.
Usually, however, a case will be resolved at the in-
dustrial councilor conciliation board level. Here an equal
number of employer and employee representatives will decide a
case.
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These bodies are fully in accordance with the spirit of
Article 8 of the 1982 Convention which states that a worker
"who considers that his employment has been unjustifiably
terminated shall be entitled to appeal against that termina-
tion to an impartial body."
The burden at the industrial councilor conciliation board
level and at the Industrial Court level is not placed en-
tirely on the shoulders of either party. The industrial or
conciliation board is required to "settle" the dispute66 and
no party is called upon to discharge a burden. A decision is
reached by a process of negotiation. This accords with the
provisions of Article 9 of the Convention which requires that
"the worker not have to bear alone the burden of proving the
termination was not justified.,,67
6. Remedies
At the industrial council and conciliation board level,
the representative of the two sides can take whatever action
they deem necessary for "settling" the dispute. In the case
of unfair dismissals, this very often entails reinstatement.
As regards the Industrial Court, the Act does not specify
what action the Court make take to rectify or remedy an un-
fair labor practice, but rather requires only that the body
"determine,,68 the dispute once it has been referred thereto
under Section 46(9). The powers have to be inferred from the
provisions of the Act itself. In various decisions, the In-
dustrial Court has been known to order a party who has com-
mitted an unfair labor practice to refrain therefrom; held
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that certain actions are null and void and, in the case of
unfairly dismissed workers, reinstated employees. Cassim
cites the limited remedies available to challenge dismissals
of workers not "otherwise regulated by legislation"69 as a
reason why a general unfair dismissal statute is necessary.
Since it has been shown that most workers are potentially
covered by this legislation, the validity of this criticism
falls away.
Another remedy provided by the Court is the status quo
order issued under Section 43. This is a temporary order
issued pending the outcome of the final decision, whether it
be made by the industrial council, the conciliation board, or
the Industrial Court itself under Section 46(9). Cassim also
claims that status quo relief is only an interim measure
which "does not by itself provide a remedy for unfair dis-
missal, unless the conduct of the employer constitutes an
f· lb' 70 h b . d hun a1r a or pract1ce. It as een exper1ence, owever,
that where a worker has been reinstated temporarily under
Section 43, there is often a climate more conducive to the
settlement of the dispute than would be the case if the
worker were to disappear from the scene completely. Since
the Industrial Court has found most unfair dismissals to be
unfair labor practices anyway and since the court has, jus-
tifiably or not, tended to look at the issue of fairness
itself at the status quo hearing,71 the value of a rein-
statement under Section 43 cannot be underestimated.
~
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Consequently , the "freezing" remedy has assumed an impor-
tance probably not envisioned by the drafters of the Act.
The emphasis on reinstatement as a remedy is in accordance
with Article 10 of the Convention. This Article provides
that only if adjudicating bodies are not empowered or find it
impractical to order reinstatement, should payment of ade-
quate compensation be deemed appropriate.
The value of the reinstatement remedy in South Africa com-
pares favorably with that in most other countries we have
considered. It was observed earlier that the inefficiency of
the reinstatement remedy was one of the characteristics of
the other countries that have been examined. In France, for
example, by nature of the fact that an unfair dismissal is
illegal but not void, reinstatement cannot be ordered.
The preceding sections have argued that the present
protection of workers against unfair dismissal is not as
tenuous as some would make out. In many areas, the law com-
pares favorably with statutes found in many major industrial-
ized powers.
A proposed amendment of the Act, due to be implemented
during the 1987 session, would further improve the position
of the unfairly dismissed worker.
D. Proposed Bill Amending the Labor Relations Act
While the Act as it presently stands protects the
unfairly dismissed worker by equating the concept with an un-
fair labor practice, the unfairly discharged worker would be
specifically protected under the proposed amendment.
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The draft Bill would include a definition of the term
"unfair dismissal" and no longer subsume it under the concept
of an unfair labor practice. Section 1 defines a discharge
as unfair it:
i. an employee's employment is terminated without valid
and fair reason:
ii. reasonable notice has not been given
beforehand by the employer to employees of the fact
that the number of employees in the employ of the
employer is to be retrenched and consultation with
the employees or their trade unions has not taken
place and the selection of employees to be dismissed
is not reasonable:
iii. the employer has not given the employee a fair oppor-
tunity to state his case prior to dismissal:
iv. a procedure agreed upon has not been followed at ter-
mination of employment.
While the amendment would further define "unfair dis-
missal," it would appear that the principles that would apply
would not differ much, if at all, from those presently ap-
plied. What results from an insertion of such a definition
is perhaps a more clearly articulated compliance with the
demands of Article 4 of the Convention.
The proposed amendment would retain the same first level
dispute resolution mechanism such as the industrial councils
and conciliation boards, but a new section, Section 45A,
would provide a mechanism independent from that in unfair
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labor practice disputes, whereby alleged unfair labor dis-
missals could eventually be adjudicated upon by the In-
dustrial Court. The Section provides that if the industrial
councilor conciliation board fails to resolve the issue of
the alleged unfair dismissal, the Industrial Court may, after
considering a number of factors including whether "there are
reasonable grounds for believing that said suspension or
dismissal is not due to misconduct on the part of said in-
dividual ••.which justified such dismissal,,,72 may "arbitrate
in respect of the dispute.,,73
An allegedly unfairly dismissed worker may still be able
to obtain status quo relief under Section 43, but because of
the redefinition of the term "unfair labor practice," are ad-
judicated upon as a separate body of claims and on their own
merit.
The proposed Bill also provides for an appeal from the In-
dustrial Court to the novel Special Labor Court.74
The proposed amendment would consequently have the effect
of taking the concept of unfair dismissal and separating it
out from the previously all-encompassing unfair labor prac-
tice concept. As a consequence, there would be specific
protection of unfairly dismissed workers and specific chan-
nels for relief. No longer will the Industrial Court be open
to suggestions that an unfair dismissal did not fall within
the definition of an unfair labor practice and was therefore
not remediable. In the final analysis, greater specificity
can only lead to closer compliance with the standards of the
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1982 Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the
Initiative of the Employer.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
It has been noticed that the common law or non-statutory
law has traditionally been harsh on the employee as far as
his rights to job security are concerned. In the United
States, judicial activism in attempting to find common law
exceptions to the at will rule has provided only sporadic and
isolated instances of protection to the unfairly dismissed
worker. Statutory protection in the United States is very
specific and of limited value to employees who are the vic-
tims of arbitrary discharge. Any attempts to bring United
States dismissal law in line with ILO standards, by finding
common law exceptions to the at will rule, necessarily fall
way short of the mark, as has been illustrated.
The foreign experience in Canada and Western Europe offers
a stark contrast. Statutory enactments, coupled with a
genuine attempt to comply with supra-national standards, have
allowed a methodical development of dismissal law largely in
keeping with ILO standards.
Considered against this background, dismissal law in South
Africa is not as limited as some would suggest. Despite the
absence at the present moment of a specific reference to
unfair dismissal, workers are nevertheless protected by the
118
119
unfair labor practice concept. In the area of the guarantee
offered, scope of protection, coverage, the hearing and
remedies, the worker in South Africa enjoys a protection of a
standard in keeping with the Western European countries,
Canada and the guidelines of the ILO itself.
The proposed amendment due to be implemented shortly can
serve only to improve the position of the unfairly dismissed
worker and make calls for a general unfair dismissal statute
less weighty than at present.
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